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RECONCILING FEDERAL AND STATE 
INTERESTS IN SECURITIES 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND EUROPE 
Roberta S. Karmel*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
ecurities law in the United States (“U.S.”) is found pri-
marily in the federal securities laws as administered by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and 
interpreted by the federal courts.  The federal securities laws 
were preceded by state securities laws administered by state 
securities commissions and stock exchange self-regulatory law.  
Although some key aspects of state securities regulation have 
been preempted by federal statutes, other aspects remain in-
tact.  Litigation in the state courts, by private parties or public 
prosecutors, sometimes creates securities law.  Furthermore, 
corporation law is primarily state law, even though it is some-
times overridden by the federal securities laws.  Self-regulatory 
organizations (“SROs”) continue to adopt and administer securi-
ties market law under the SEC’s oversight, as well as to admin-
ister securities arbitration facilities.  In addition to competing 
with the federal and state courts and with state and SRO agen-
cies as lawmakers, the SEC also competes with other federal 
financial regulators, in particular with the Commodities Fu-
tures Trading Commission, the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Department of the Treasury, with regard to the parameters of 
its jurisdiction to regulate securities products and the securities 
industry.  In times of market stress, when investors are dis-
  
 * Roberta S. Karmel is a Professor, Chairman of the Steering Committee, 
and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of International Business Law at 
Brooklyn Law School.  She is a former Commissioner of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  A research stipend from Brooklyn Law School was of 
assistance in the preparation of this Article.  The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the helpful comments of Paul Arlman and Claire Kelly and the research 
assistance of Brooklyn Law School students Hui (Hannah) Cao, R. Jane Lee, 
and Kristin Mattiske.  The Article reflects the information available on this 
topic as of September 2002. 
S 
File: KARMEL Base Macro  Final.doc Created on:  4/4/2003 2:32 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:30 AM 
496 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
gruntled, some of the fault lines in the competition among secu-
rities regulators and lawmakers become more apparent.  
Europe is struggling with similar problems in reconciling fed-
eral and state law and regulation concerning the capital mar-
kets and public companies.  Although a series of securities laws, 
directives, and the adoption of a single European currency have 
helped to integrate European capital markets, they remain 
fragmented to a large extent.  European Union (“EU”) directives 
are not self-operating and must be translated into national leg-
islation in every EU member state, a slow and cumbersome 
process. An ambitious Financial Services Action Plan adopted 
in May 1999 will require the amendment of some directives and 
the adoption of new directives by 2005.  Although the EU does 
not have a federal securities commission, two new European 
Securities Committees have been established to facilitate the 
realization of the Financial Services Action Plan.  The Euro-
pean Court of Justice also creates securities law at the federal 
level.  Although securities law and corporation law remain pri-
marily national, much new securities law is derived from EU 
directives.  Every EU member state now has a government se-
curities commission, but the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) has con-
solidated regulation via the Financial Services Authority 
(“FSA”) and other countries are considering this model.  In 
some countries in Europe there continues to be self-regulation 
by SROs, but as a general matter SRO regulation has been 
transferred to government securities commissions.  
Some scholars believe that competition among financial regu-
lators is beneficial and results in an optimum level of regulatory 
intrusion upon private business interests.  Proponents of this 
theory frequently are apologists for deregulation.  This author 
is considerably more skeptical of regulatory competition be-
cause it frequently undermines the rule of law.  Nevertheless, 
some competition between federal and state regulators is deeply 
rooted in constitutional federalism.  In both the U.S. and the 
EU the burden is on the proponents of federal regulation to jus-
tify its necessity.  This Article will attempt to describe the divi-
sion between federal and state securities regulation in the U.S. 
and the EU, suggest that the causes of regulatory competition 
are historical and political, and explore whether there are prin-
cipled justifications for allocating regulatory responsibilities 
among federal, state and SRO interests.  In addition, this Arti-
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cle will inquire as to how competing regulatory interests should 
be reconciled.  
In general, as the securities markets in the U.S. became more 
national and securities firms matured, federal securities laws 
came to trump state laws.  Similarly, in Europe, a determina-
tion to integrate the capital markets of EU member states led to 
the need for securities regulation at the EU level. Yet, local or 
state interests, as well as political beliefs have countered this 
trend toward centralizing securities law.  This tension is very 
well illustrated in the area of takeover law.  
Part II of this Article will outline the framework and histori-
cal development of securities law in the U. S., and the long term 
trend toward federal preemption.  Part III will outline the 
framework and historical development of securities law in the 
EU.  Part IV of this Article will discuss the tension between fed-
eral and state interests in takeover law in both the U.S. and 
Europe, as an example of an effort to reconcile competing regu-
latory goals.  The Article will then discuss, in Part V, the views 
of the proponents of regulatory competition and the author’s 
reservations about these theories.  It will suggest that the fun-
damental purpose of securities regulation, which is the promo-
tion of investor confidence, should be the guiding principle in 
allocating regulatory responsibilities between federal, state and 
SRO lawmakers, and administrators. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERALISM IN U.S. SECURITIES 
REGULATION 
A. Constitutionality of Blue-Sky Laws and SRO Regulation 
State corporation law, stock exchange listing requirements 
and market rules, and state securities regulation (or “blue-sky” 
laws) preceded federal securities regulation.  This tripartite 
regulatory system was recognized when the first federal securi-
ties law, the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)1 was 
passed and when the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Ex-
change Act”)2 was adopted the following year creating the SEC.  
The federal -state-SRO system of securities regulation involved 
conflicting philosophies and considerable overlap and duplica-
  
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000). 
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tion.  As a general matter, the federal laws covering the flota-
tion of public offerings were based on a full disclosure philoso-
phy, whereas much of the state system was merit based, allow-
ing a blue-sky commissioner to judge whether an issuer’s capi-
tal structure was fair, just and equitable. 
There was not a well articulated allocation of obligations and 
priorities, and it was not clear that Congress “had any system-
atic understanding of what the relations of state and federal 
securities regulations should be, how regulatory responsibilities 
should be allocated, or how federal disclosure regulation and 
state merit regulation should be accommodated to each other.”3  
SRO regulation, by contrast, set forth merit-based listing and 
offering standards for public companies,4 just and equitable 
principles of conduct for member firms and associated persons,5 
and regulated trading markets and access fees for using those 
markets.6  The SEC’s authority with respect to altering stock 
exchange listing standards is unclear,7 but since 1975 its over-
sight authority with respect to other SRO rules is fairly well 
established.8  On the other hand, SROs are not considered gov-
  
 3. Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offer-
ings, 41 BUS. LAW . 785, 793 (1986). 
 4. See A.B.A., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and 
Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1489, 1510–14 (2002) [hereinafter ABA, 
Market Structure Report].  See also Rule 2710 (Corporate Financing Rule — 
Underwriting Terms and Arrangements), N.A.S.D. Sec. Dealers Manual 
(CCH), at 4501–16 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter N.A.S.D. Manual]. 
 5. See Business Conduct Rules 2100 (General Standards), 2300 (Transac-
tions with Customers), 2400 (Commissions, Mark-Ups and Charges), N.A.S.D. 
Manual, at 4111–41, 4261–81. 
 6. Until 1975 the New York Stock Exchange enforced a fixed minimum 
commission schedule on its member firms.  Although fixed commissions were 
abolished in 1975, see Rule 19b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (2002), SROs continue 
to levy other fees, for example, with respect to trading data, subject to SEC 
oversight, see U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMM. ON MARKET INFO. (2001), at www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
marketreg/marketinfo/finalreport.htm.  The NASD continues to have a ban 
against granting a selling concession or discount in a fixed price offering to a 
non-broker-dealer.  See Conduct Rule 2740 (Selling Concessions, Discounts 
and Other Allowances), N.A.S.D. Manual, at 4534.  The NYSE and Nasdaq 
have numerous market conduct rules. 
 7. See ABA, Market Structure Report, supra note 4, at 1516–20. 
 8. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 6(a), 15(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(a), 
78o(a) (2000).  When the Exchange Act was passed in 1934 the SEC had over-
sight only of stock exchanges, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 48 
Stat. 881, 892, and broker dealers, see id. § 15, 48 Stat. at 895–96.  The NASD 
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ernment agencies, although they exercise delegated governmen-
tal authority.9 
Federal preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause 
is not a politically popular mode of legislation.  Nevertheless, 
Congress has frequently preempted state law, particularly in 
the area of financial regulation.  Preemption may be express, 
implied, or by reason of conflict.  Preemption is express when 
there is an explicit statutory command that state law be dis-
placed.10  A clear example of express preemption in financial 
regulation is in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (“ERISA”), which states that the provisions of that act 
“shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. . . . ”11  Pre-
  
was organized after a 1938 amendment adding section 15A of the Exchange 
Act.  Over-the-Counter Market Act, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 (2000)).  In 1964, the SEC was given jurisdic-
tion over persons associated with broker-dealers and non-listed issuers.  See 
Act of Aug. 20, 1964, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) 
(2000)).  In 1975, the SEC gained further oversight over exchanges and other 
market participants.  See Act of June 4, 1975, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, q-1s(b)(c) (2000)). 
 9. “Mere approval” of a private regulation by a government agency does 
not necessarily constitute state action.  Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1466–68 (N.D. Ill. 1997).  Whether state 
action exists depends upon whether there is a sufficient “nexus” between the 
State and the action that is being challenged.  Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 
457 U.S. 922, 1004–05 (1982).  Courts have rather consistently held that 
SROs are not state actors for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 
198, 206–07 (2d Cir. 1999); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179 
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 134, 137–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  But 
see Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. Amer. Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 
1971) (holding that the American Stock Exchange is a governmental agency, 
due to its “intimate involvement” with the SEC); Villani v. New York Stock 
Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that Fifth 
Amendment due process requirements apply to disciplinary hearings of NYSE 
because “[s]uch hearings are conducted under the self-regulatory power con-
ferred upon it by . . . the [SEC]”).  See also Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 
341, 366 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); 
Clon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  
See also Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Just a Private Club: Self-
Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453, 483–84 (1995). 
 10. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 382 (1992). 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2002). 
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emption is implied and state law is therefore displaced “if fed-
eral law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
states to supplement it.”12  This type of implied preemption is 
often referred to as field preemption.  State law may be dis-
placed under a conflict analysis if either it is impossible to com-
ply with both a state and a federal law, or if the state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”13  An example of 
conflict preemption in securities law is Edgar v. Mite Corp., 
where an Illinois takeover statute was found to conflict with the 
Exchange Act.14  In all cases involving preemption, the courts 
look to the intent of Congress, which frequently is unclear due 
to the political sensitivities involved. 
When the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were initially 
passed, Congress did not explicitly preempt state law.  To the 
contrary, Congress inserted “savings clauses” in both the Secu-
rities Act and the Exchange Act.15  Former Section 18 of the Se-
curities Act provided:  “Nothing in this Subchapter shall affect 
the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or 
office performing like functions) of any State or Territory of the 
United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or 
any person.”16  The legislative history of this provision is sparse.  
However, the initial Securities Act bill, which passed the House, 
  
 12. Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).  See also 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 95–99 (1983) (finding that state laws 
having a connection with or reference to employee benefit plans are pre-
empted by ERISA, with which Congress intended to preempt an entire field); 
Patenaude v. Equitable Life Ins., 290 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] 
statute may so completely preempt state law that it occupies the entire field, 
barring assertion of any state law claims and permitting removal to federal 
court.”).  In Patenaude the court held that a deferred tax variable annuity 
purchased by the plaintiff fell within the meaning of “covered security” under 
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”), and therefore 
plaintiff’s state law claims were appropriately discarded by the district court.  
See generally id.  The Court stated:  “Congress has consistently indicated its 
intent, particularly with the passage of SLUSA, to displace state regulation 
insofar as it relates to the marketing of the securities component of variable 
annuities.”  Id. at 1027. 
 13. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
 14. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 15. See infra notes 16–20. 
 16. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000)). 
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set forth a clause prohibiting the sale of securities in interstate 
commerce into any state if such sale would have violated the 
blue-sky laws of that state.17  The stated purpose of this prohibi-
tion was “to assure the states that the [Securities Act] was not 
an attempt to supplant their laws, but an attempt to supple-
ment their laws and to assist them in enforcing their laws in 
those cases where they have no control.”18  This clause was later 
deleted by Senate amendment.19  Former Section 28(a) of the 
Exchange Act was similar to former Section 18 of the Securities 
Act.  It provided:  “nothing in this chapter shall affect the juris-
diction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer 
performing like functions) of any State over any security or any 
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.”20   
Although these “savings clauses” indicated a congressional 
intent not to preempt state blue-sky law generally,21 the Su-
preme Court could nevertheless have declared that some or all 
state securities laws were preempted under field or conflict pre-
emption principles.  In addition to being invalidated due to fed-
eral preemption, state blue-sky legislation could have been de-
clared invalid under the Commerce Clause.  Legislation will be 
invalidated under the Commerce Clause if it imposes a burden 
on interstate commerce that is excessive in relation to the local 
interests served.22  In many instances, state blue-sky regula-
tions imposed burdens on interstate commerce.  While such 
burdens can be justified on the ground that a state has a legiti-
mate interest in capital investment or financial services within 
its borders, regulation that effectively impedes the interstate 
capital markets would be invalid.23 
  
 17. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 10–11, 25 (1933). 
 18. Federal Securities Act: Hearing before the Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73rd Cong. 117 (1933) (statement of Ollie M. 
Butler, Foreign Service Div., Dept. of Commerce). 
 19. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 27 (1933). 
 20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28, 48 Stat. 903 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000)). 
 21. See Russell A. Smith, “Blue Sky” Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 
34 MICH. L. REV. 1135, 1160 (1936). 
 22. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 23. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (holding that the 
Alabama domestic preference tax statute violated the Equal Protection 
Clause); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (deeming uncon-
stitutional a Florida statute that prevented out-of-state bank holding compa-
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The constitutionality of state blue-sky laws was first tested in 
three Supreme Court cases decided in 1917, sixteen years be-
fore the first federal securities law was enacted.24  While a vari-
ety of constitutional arguments were raised in these cases, the 
cases particularly focused upon the possible limitations imposed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment on the power of a state to pre-
vent fraudulent securities issuances.  Only one of the opinions, 
however, specifically discussed the contention that the blue-sky 
laws burdened interstate commerce.  In Hall v. Geiger-Jones 
Co., the Court upheld the blue-sky statute under review, on the 
ground that the statute was only applicable to dispositions of 
securities within the state and, thus, could not burden inter-
state commerce. 25  The Court found that:  
Upon their transportation into the State there is no impedi-
ment — no regulation of them or interference with them after 
they get there.  There is the exaction only that he who dis-
poses of them there shall be licensed to do so, and this only 
that they may not appear in false character and impose an ap-
pearance of a value which they may not possess — and this 
certainly is only an indirect burden upon them as objects of in-
terstate commerce, if they may be regarded as such.26 
This reasoning clearly suggests that in-state corporations that 
participate in purely local financing ventures are subject to 
blue-sky merit regulation and that blue-sky merit regulation 
limited to intrastate issuances is valid.  It remained an open 
question, however, whether this reasoning would insulate blue-
sky merit regulation that had the effect of compelling an out-of-
state corporation, which had registered an offering with the 
SEC and made the full disclosure required by federal law, to 
change its capitalization in order to syndicate a securities offer-
ing nationally. 
  
nies from owning or controlling any business within the state that sold in-
vestment advisory services); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 
U.S. 318, 329, 329–32 (1977) (invalidating a section of the New York Tax Law 
on Commerce Clause grounds, because law provided a “direct commercial 
advantage to local business” by imposing a greater tax burden on out-of-state 
securities transactions than on like in-state transactions). 
 24. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux 
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 
U.S. 568 (1917). 
 25. Hall, 242 U.S. at 539. 
 26. Id. at 557–58. 
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In the period between 1977 and 1987 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed securities law federalism issues in the context of draw-
ing a line between state corporate law concerning the fiduciary 
duties of managers and directors and federal securities law ob-
ligations placed on public companies and their officers and di-
rectors.  From a political standpoint, the Court seemed con-
cerned with restricting the coverage of the federal securities 
laws, especially in the corporate governance area.  In view of 
the Court’s deference to congressional determination of the 
scope of the commerce power since 1937, the Court did not rest 
its rulings on constitutional grounds as much as on its construc-
tion of congressional intent in enacting the securities laws.  
Nevertheless, these decisions should be viewed as part of the 
Court’s renewed interest in constitutional federalism as a 
means to constrain the growth of federal power.27 
Beginning in the mid-1970s the Court articulated a distinc-
tion between state corporate law and the federal securities law 
that has long been less than clear-cut.28  In 1995, in a non-
securities law case, the Supreme Court stated: “Corporations 
are creatures of state laws and investors commit their funds to 
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where 
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of direc-
tors with respect to stock holders, state law will govern the in-
ternal affairs of the corporation.”29 
Thereafter, in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,30 the Court ap-
plied this principle in a case arising under the federal securities 
laws involving a short form merger.  Under Delaware law own-
ers of at least 90% of a subsidiary’s stock may merge with that 
subsidiary without requesting the consent of minority share-
holders — who, in turn, must receive fair value for their 
  
 27. See Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS  
L.J. 431, 432–34 (2002); A. C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individ-
ual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 
WASH. U. L. Q. 435, 491, 494 (2000). 
 28. See Arthur Fleicher, Jr., Federalism and Corporation Law: An Assess-
ment, 78 HARV. L.  REV. 1146, 1179 (1965); Roberta S. Karmel, Qualitative 
Standards for “Qualified Securities”: SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 
CATH. U. L. REV. 809 (1987); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate 
Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 545 (1984). 
 29. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). 
 30. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
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shares.31  The plaintiff, the minority shareholders in Santa Fe, 
did not allege any material misrepresentation or omission.32  
Rather, they argued that the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws were applicable to a breach of corporate fiduci-
ary duty, because the majority shareholders were not pursuing 
a legitimate corporate purpose.33  The Court, however, refused 
to apply Rule 10b-5 to the allegations of “internal corporate 
mismanagement.”34  It stated:  “Absent a clear indication of 
congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substan-
tial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transac-
tions in securities, particularly where established state policies 
of corporate regulation would be overridden.”35 
In Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc.,36 the Supreme Court indi-
cated that Santa Fe would not be confined to its facts, but 
rather was a general holding concerning federalism.  Schreiber 
raised the issue of whether the withdrawal of a hostile tender 
offer bid and the substitution of a partial bid, following negotia-
tions with the target company’s management, constituted a 
manipulative act under the Williams Act, an amendment to the 
Exchange Act which regulates tender offers.37  The Court held 
that the term “manipulation” in sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the 
Exchange Act should be similarly interpreted and that manipu-
lative acts require misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 
The conflict between state law and the Williams Act also was 
presented to the Court in cases raising the issue of whether 
state statutes adopted to protect corporations against hostile 
takeovers were unconstitutional.  At about the same time as the 
Williams Act was passed, a variety of state statutes sought to 
control bids for “local” companies by subjecting such bids to ad-
ministrative delays and permitting a state securities commis-
sioner to determine the fairness of the bid.  In the 1982 case of 
Edgar v. MITE Corp. the Supreme Court held such a state se-
  
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 253, 262 (2001). 
 32. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 479. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 37. The Williams Act, which regulates tender offers, is contained in sec-
tions 13(d)–(e) and 14(d)–(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e) 
(2002); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)–(f) (2002) and the regulations thereunder, 17 
C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 13e-101, 240.14a-1 to 14f-1. 
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curities regulatory statute — the Illinois takeover law — incon-
sistent with the U.S. Constitution.38  There were six separate 
opinions issued in this case, and a majority found only that the 
state law imposed an indirect burden on interstate commerce.39  
A plurality of Justices found direct burdens on commerce,40 and 
another plurality found preemption of the state law by the Wil-
liams Act.41  The Court explained that its traditional rationale 
for upholding state blue-sky laws against commerce clause in-
validity “was that they only regulated transactions occurring 
within the regulating States.”42  The Court stated, however, 
that the Illinois regulatory scheme went beyond regulating in-
trastate transactions.43  In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America,44 a subsequent case raising the issues of whether a 
state control share statute was unconstitutional under the Su-
premacy or Commerce Clauses, the Supreme Court upheld an 
Indiana statute because: (1) it preserved the neutrality of the 
Williams Act; (2) left to shareholders the decision whether to 
accept the offer; and (3) regulated internal corporate affairs.45 
It is frequently stated that SROs exercise delegated govern-
mental authority.46  In fact, stock exchange regulation preceded 
the federal securities laws and SEC oversight was overlaid 
upon an existing regulatory framework.  The NASD was estab-
lished pursuant to an amendment to the Exchange Act and all 
SEC registered broker-dealers are required to be NASD mem-
  
 38. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 39. Id. at 643–46. 
 40. Id. at 641–43. 
 41. Id. at 630–34. 
 42. Id. at 641 (citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 45. See id. at 82, 83, 91, 94. 
 46. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963) (describ-
ing the relationship between the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC as “a 
type of partnership between government and private enterprise”) (emphasis 
added); Bruan, Gordon & Co. v. New York Stock Exchange, 502 F. Supp. 897, 
903 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (describing the NASD as “an arm or agent” of the SEC); 
Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 154 (1996); Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not 
Just a Private Club: Self-Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When En-
forcing Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453, 483–84 (arguing that, 
because Congress has delegated substantial powers to SROs in securities mat-
ters, SROs should be deemed state actors when enforcing federal law under 
the Exchange Act). 
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bers.47  Therefore, NASD regulation, in contrast to stock ex-
change regulation, can more appropriately be viewed as dele-
gated governmental regulatory authority.  An important reason 
for putting the SEC umbrella over SRO activity is that this 
gives SROs qualified immunity from the antitrust laws.48 
The relationship between the SEC and SROs raises some in-
teresting constitutional questions that have never been tested.  
Can an administrative agency with delegated authority sub-
delegate that authority to SROs?  Should SRO regulations be 
viewed as state law or federal law?  Is there a difference be-
tween listing standards, which were once a matter of contract 
between exchanges and listed companies, and regulations of 
stock exchange members and stock markets? 
The uncertain status of stock exchange listing standards was 
tested in Business Roundtable v. SEC, in which the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Circuit Court”) 
abrogated an SEC rule attempting to impose a uniform voting 
rights standard upon all national marketplaces.49  The court 
found that the SEC regulation was a “rule” under Sections 19(b) 
and 19(c) of the Exchange Act,50 but that it was not in further-
ance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.51  The court’s ration-
ale was that there was no indication in the statute that Con-
gress intended to permit such a broad federal preemption over 
corporate governance and shareholder rights — matters tradi-
tionally left to state law.52  Presumably, however, the exchanges 
could have adopted the SEC’s rule as a matter of non-federal 
  
 47. The NASD was created under the authority of Section 15A of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 (2000).  See Roberet N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky 
Investments for That Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio 
Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. L.  
REV. 189, 197 n.32 (1998). 
 48. See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
 49. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 50. Id. at 409.  Under section 19(b), SROs are required to receive SEC ap-
proval of any and all new rules and any proposed changes to existing rules.  
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1).  The Commission then either approves the proposed 
rule, or schedules a hearing in order to decide whether a proposal will be ac-
cepted.  Id. § 78s(b)(2).  Under section 19(c), the Commission also retains the 
authority to itself amend the rules of a self-regulatory organization, “as the 
Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration 
of the self-regulatory organization.”  Id. § 78s(c). 
 51. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410–17. 
 52. Id. 
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law, and they subsequently did so.53  Nevertheless, the SEC was 
required under the Exchange Act to approve these “voluntary” 
rules.54 
B. Deregulation through Statutory Preemption 
While the Supreme Court was allocating regulatory responsi-
bility for takeovers and other corporate restructurings based on 
whether statutes involved matters of express federal policy re-
garding the protection of investors or internal corporate gov-
ernance, the securities industry was advocating preemption of 
state blue-sky laws concerning securities offerings and the regu-
lation of broker-dealers and investment advisers.  This move to 
preempt state blue-sky laws found favor in the deregulatory 
politics of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, 
and the Contract with America advocated by Newt Gingrich.55  
Initially, complaints concerning duplication and inconsistency 
of unnecessary regulatory burdens were answered by a 1980 
statute56 adding Section 19(c)(1) to the Securities Act authoriz-
ing the SEC to cooperate with state government representatives 
in securities matters to achieve effective, uniform securities 
regulations with a minimum interference with the business of 
capital formation.57  The statute mandated an annual confer-
ence of SEC and state regulators for the purpose of developing 
uniform securities forms and procedures and a small issues ex-
  
 53. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing 
Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 346 (2001). 
 54. Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000).  See also Self-
Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27,554, 54 Fed. Reg. 
53,227 (Dec. 27, 1989) (release by which the SEC approved NYSE’s original 
voting rule); Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
28,517, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,626-01 (Oct. 12, 1990) (release by which SEC approved 
NASD’s adoption of the former SEC Rule 19b-4); Douglas C. Michael, Unten-
able Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards under the Securities 
Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW  1461, 1472 n.70 (1992) (“[A]lthough [SEC] Rule 
19c-4 is invalid, its verbatim counterpart adopted by the NYSE still binds 
listed companies.”). 
 55. See Pritchard, supra note 27, at 436 n.5; Richard W. Painter, Respond-
ing to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of 
Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 (1998). 
 56. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 
Sec. 505, § 19(c), 94 Stat. 2275, 2292–93 (adding Section 19(c) of the Securities 
Act). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(d)(1)–(2) (2000). 
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emption from registration.58  Whether this act could have man-
dated the states to develop such forms, procedures and exemp-
tions is unclear under constitutional federalism.59  Further, the 
act provided that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as 
authorizing preemption of State law.”60 
Pursuant to this directive the SEC worked with the North 
American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) to 
develop a state law uniform limited offering exemption 
(“ULOE”).  By 1996, thirty-eight states had adopted a form of 
ULOE and ten other states had similar exemptions.61  A uni-
form system of registration for securities salesmen was also 
worked out with the NASD.62  However, there was considerable 
securities industry dissatisfaction with the slow and essentially 
voluntary progress of the SEC and NASAA in achieving uni-
form regulations pursuant to Section 19(c).63   
Much more sweeping deregulation of the state blue-sky laws 
through preemption was accomplished in the late 1990s, first by 
the National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996 
  
 58. Id. §§ 77s(d)(3)–(4). 
 59. Such action appears to be unconstitutional “commandeering” of states 
by federal government.  See Massey, supra note 27, at 433–34; Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel 
states to enact a federal regulatory program); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992).  Yet, it is unclear whether Congress might be able to accom-
plish this goal through preemption.  See Massey, supra note 27, at 453–63, 
505–06, 512–13.  Recently, Congress adapted a more pointed threat of pre-
emption of state insurance regulation of agents in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 321, 113 Stat. 1338, 1422–24 (1999). 
 60. 15 U.S.C. §77s (c)(3)(C). 
 61. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.19 (4th ed. 
2002). 
 62. See Securities Uniformity: Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securi-
ties Law, Securities Act. Release No. 33-7050, 56 S.E.C. Docket 764 (Nov. 2, 
1994), available at 1994 WL 95225. 
 63. State Regulators Adopt Model Commodity Code, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 15, at 622 (Apr. 12, 1985); 12 JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 
7:32, at 7-71 to 7-73 (2002); Hugh H. Makens, et al., Blue Sky Practice Part I: 
Doing it Right: Avoiding Liability Arising from State Private Offerings under 
ULOE and Limited Offering Exemptions, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REGULATION D OFFERINGS AND PRIVATE 
PLACEMENTS 271, 280 (2001); David F.E. Banks, Hawaii Response to Regula-
tion D, 23 HAWAII B.J. 1, 3 (1991); Mark A. Sargent & Hugh H. Makens, 
ULOE: New Hope, New Challenge, 45 BUS. LAW. 1319, 1319–20 (1990). 
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(“NSMIA”)64 and then by the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).65  The NSMIA preempted 
state securities law in three areas.  First, it preempted blue-sky 
securities registration, merit review and prospectus disclosure 
requirements for SEC registered investment companies and 
stock exchange and Nasdaq listed securities.  It also preempted 
blue-sky law in most private placements.66  Prior to the NSMIA, 
blue-sky laws all contained a requirement for registration of 
securities, but most state laws had an exemption from their reg-
istration requirements for issuers listed on a national securities 
exchange.67  The NASD had lobbied for Nasdaq listed securities 
to be similarly exempt, but the NASAA wished for greater con-
trol over the criteria for a blue chip exemption.68  The NSMIA 
essentially mandated a blue chip exemption for all nationally 
traded securities.  This preemption did not completely eliminate 
merit standards because the NASD regulates underwriting 
terms and conditions with respect to offerings underwritten by 
broker-dealers.69  Further, this SRO regulation is a uniform na-
tional standard.  Whether it is federal law or state law is an 
interesting question. 
Second, the NSMIA preempted state regulation of broker-
dealers with respect to capital, custody, margin, financial re-
sponsibility, records, bonding and reporting requirements to the 
extent inconsistent with federal law.70  Third, the SEC was 
given exclusive regulatory authority over investment advisers 
to SEC registered investment companies and advisers with $25 
million or more in assets under management.71  The differing 
language used by Congress in preempting state regulation of 
  
 64. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.) 
 65. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. §77r (2000). 
 67. Sargent, supra note 3, at 833–35. 
 68. See NASAA Proposes ’56 Uniform Act Amendments at Spring Meeting, 
18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 399 (Mar. 21, 1986). 
 69. Conduct Rule 2710–2730, N.A.S.D. Manual, at 4501–31. 
 70. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-290, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3420–22 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§78o(h)(1) (2000)). 
 71. The Investment Adviser Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 
(2000). 
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broker-dealers and investment advisers is of interest.  With re-
spect to broker-dealers, the NSMIA provided that:  
No law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative ac-
tion of any State or political subdivision thereof shall establish 
capital, custody, margin, financial responsibility, making and 
keeping records, bonding, or financial or operational reporting 
requirements for brokers, dealers, municipal securities deal-
ers, government securities brokers, or government securities 
dealers that differ from, or are in addition to, the require-
ments in those areas established under this title. 72   
Although state licensing of persons associated with broker-
dealers was not preempted, the SEC was directed to conduct a 
study of the impact of disparate state licensing requirements for 
such persons.73   
With respect to investment advisers, the NSMIA provided 
that “[n]o law of any State or political subdivision thereof re-
quiring the registration, licensing, or qualification as an in-
vestment adviser . . . shall apply to any person . . . that is regis-
tered [with the SEC] as an investment adviser.”74  Further, ad-
visers exempt from the definition of “investment advisor” in the 
federal securities laws were similarly exempt.75  Associated per-
sons could be licensed or registered only if any such person had 
a place of business within a state.76  The preemption of state 
regulation of SEC regulated broker-dealers and investment ad-
visers and their associated persons was not complete.  The 
states retained authority to investigate and bring enforcement 
actions for fraud or deceit or other unlawful conduct by a bro-
ker-dealer or investment adviser or their associated persons.77 
  
 72. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-290, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 3420, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78o(h)(1) 
(2000)). 
 73. See id § 510(d), 110 Stat. 3416, 3451.  See also  Susan S. Krawczyk, 
Recent Developments of Interest to Sellers of Variable Insurance Products, in 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONFERENCE ON LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY PRODUCTS: CURRENT SECURITIES, TAX, ERISA, AND STATE 
REGULATORY ISSUES 239, 252–55 (1998) (discussing the objectives and conclu-
sions of the study). 
 74. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-290, sec. 303, §203A(b)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 3416, 3437 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1)(A) (2000)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1) (2000). 
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The congressional justification for the preemption provisions 
of the NSMIA was that the system of dual federal and state se-
curities regulation was unnecessary, because it was redundant, 
costly and ineffective.78  Therefore regulatory responsibility was 
allocated based on the nature of the securities offering.79  Inher-
ently national offerings were made subject only to federal regu-
lation.80  There is some irony to such sweeping preemption of 
state law emanating from a Republican Congress supposedly 
committed to lessening federal regulation, but the NSMIA was 
a deregulatory statute favored by business groups.81 
The SLUSA was even more deregulatory and its way of effect-
ing preemption was more radical.  It was adopted as a reaction 
against attempts to evade the obstacles to federal securities 
class actions erected by the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)82 by using state court class actions.  The 
PSLRA did not change the provisions of the law covering securi-
ties anti-fraud actions, but it made plaintiff class action suits 
more difficult by, among other things, reducing the control of 
plaintiff’s counsel over class action litigation;83 imposing stricter 
pleading standards84 and providing a safe harbor for forward 
looking information.85  These procedural reforms were aimed at 
curbing abusive litigation in the federal courts; they left state 
  
 78. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920, 3920–21. 
 79. Id. at 40. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection:  
Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities 
Fraud, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS . 169, 170 (1997). 
 82. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 83. “Appointing lead plaintiff on the basis of financial interest, rather than 
on a ‘first come, first serve’ basis, was intended to endure that institutional 
plaintiffs with expertise in the securities market and real financial interests 
in the integrity of the market would control the litigation, not lawyers.”  In re 
Donnkenny, Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing H.R. 
CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–35 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 
730–34).  Also, there is a stay of discovery while a motion to dismiss is pend-
ing.  15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000). 
 84. Specific factual allegations raising a strong inference of scienter must 
be pled.  15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000). 
 85. 15 U.S.C. §78u-5 (2000). 
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securities fraud actions alone.86  Some plaintiffs’ lawyers re-
acted by bringing class actions in securities fraud cases in state 
courts, particularly in California.   
High technology companies and other business groups then 
lobbied for federal preemption on the grounds that the PSLRA 
was being undermined and Congress obliged.87  Finding that 
national uniformity was preferable to fragmentation because of 
the need for predictability,88 Congress engaged in selective pre-
emption by depriving state courts of the power to adjudicate 
securities fraud class actions in cases involving securities listed 
on a national stock exchange or the Nasdaq.  The SLUSA pro-
vides that no class action based on state law alleging fraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a “covered security” may 
be maintained in state or federal court and any such action 
shall be removable to a federal district court and dismissed.89  
Although the Congress that passed the SLUSA was generally 
committed to federalism, it found that promoting efficient na-
tional securities markets was a more convincing and compelling 
interest than reinforcing state rights.90 
Although the Republican majority succeeded in pushing 
through the SLUSA, there were strong dissents by Democrats 
in both the Senate and the House.  Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, 
and Johnson pointed out that roughly 60% of state class action 
suits filed after the PLSRA were filed in California and al-
though one state should not set a “pro-plaintiff” national stan-
dard for securities fraud, Congress should not second-guess 
California judgments in balancing the interests of local busi-
nesses against the interests of local investors.91  Dissenters in 
the House similarly felt this avoidance of the PLSRA was a 
problem for the California legislature.  Further, they pointed 
out the irony in “the Republican-led Congress that campaigns 
  
 86. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private 
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN . L. REV. 273, 287 (1998). 
 87. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemp-
tion of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4–5 
(1998). 
 88. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3 (1998). 
 89. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, sec. 101, § 16, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)–
(c) (2000)). 
 90. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 5. 
 91. Id. at 13. 
File: KARMEL Base Macro  Final.doc Created on: 4/4/2003 2:32 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:30 AM 
2003] SECURITIES REGULATION U.S. & EU 513 
on returning power to the states and protecting individual 
choice [championing] a federal mandate abolishing important 
state prerogatives along with protections and rights.”92 
C. Preemption of State Common Law in the Payment for Order 
Flow Cases 
Payment for order flow is the remuneration in the form of 
monetary or other benefits given to retail securities broker-
dealers for routing customers’ orders for execution to particular 
wholesale dealers, market makers, or exchanges.93  With the 
advent of computer advances and automated trading systems, 
this practice became increasingly widespread in the 1980s and 
1990s,94 although it may have diminished as a result of securi-
ties trading decimalization.95  Payment for order flow is a con-
troversial practice.96  At one extreme it could be viewed as com-
mercial bribery.  At the other extreme it could be viewed as wel-
come competition to the monopolistic trading practices of the 
stock exchanges and the NASD.97  In any event, it raises ques-
tions about whether payment for order flow arrangements are 
inconsistent with a broker’s duty of best execution.  There also 
has been controversy as to whether payment for order flow 
should be abolished or be regulated by federal or state law.98 
Concerned with the “securities industry’s languor,” such as 
“misallocation of capital, widespread inefficiencies, and unde-
  
 92. H. R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 46 (1998). 
 93. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34,902, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 55,006, 55,008 (Nov. 2, 1999).  
 94. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,026, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 52,934, 52,936 (Oct. 6, 1993).  See also SEC, DIVISION OF MARKET 
REGULATION, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET 
DEVELOPMENTS 8-9 (1994). 
 95. Since decimalization lowered spreads, the incentive for payment for 
order flow arrangements decreased.  See Unger, Exchange Officials Testify 
Decimals Have Affected Depth, Liquidity of Trading, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 21, at 803 (May 28, 2001). 
 96. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,026, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 52,934, 52,935 (Oct. 6, 1993). 
 97. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
19,047, 47 Fed. Reg. 41,896 (Sept. 22, 1982).  For a review of the debate con-
cerning payment for order flow, see Note, The Perils of Payment for Order 
Flow, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1675 (1994).   
 98. See id. 
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sirable and potentially harmful fragmentation of trading,”99 in 
1975 Congress enacted extensive amendments to the Exchange 
Act and directed the SEC to facilitate the development of a na-
tional market system to promote efficiency and fair competition 
in the securities industry.  Pursuant to this mandate, the SEC 
adopted Rule 10b-10 in 1977, which required brokers and deal-
ers to disclose, among other things, the amount of remuneration 
received and the source and amount of any other remuneration 
received.100  The 1977 version of Rule 10b-10 did not specifically 
mention order flow as one of the “other remunerations.”101 
The growth and pervasiveness of the practice, however, 
aroused extensive debate over its merits and harms.  In re-
sponse, the SEC conducted a comprehensive study of order flow 
payments.  The SEC concluded that the practice produced the 
following economic benefits to customers:  lower unit costs; in-
creased retail brokerage firm revenues; lowered commissions; 
more expeditious executions; enhanced customer services; in-
creased competition from automated execution systems and re-
lated practices; increased competition between wholesale deal-
ers and exchanges and vertically integrated firms; and reduced 
execution costs in all markets, including the exchanges.102  The 
SEC also recognized the opposing concerns as to the possible 
conflict of interest and breach of duty of best order execution.103 
In an attempt to address the issue with more particularity, 
the SEC amended Rule 10b-10 in 1994.104  The amended Rule 
10b-10, which became effective in October 1995, defined order 
flow payment as any form or arrangement compensating bro-
kers or dealers in return for the routing of orders.105  The SEC 
rejected as too burdensome and unworkable proposals that or-
der flow payments be passed through to the customers,106 as 
well as its own initial proposal that brokers disclose the amount 
  
 99. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 1 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 180. 
 100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (2002). 
 101. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-13,508, 12 S.E.C. Docket No. 299 
(May 5, 1997). 
 102. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,026, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 52,934, 52,939–40 (Oct. 13, 1993).  
 103. Id. at 52,936–37. 
 104. See Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34,902, 59 
Fed. Reg. 55,006 (Nov. 2, 1994). 
 105. Id. at 55,008. 
 106. Id. at 55,010–11 n.42. 
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of payments for order flow.107  Amended Rule 10b-10, however, 
requires a broker-dealer to disclose in each transaction confir-
mation slip whether payment for order flow was received, and 
that the source and nature of the payment would be available at 
the customer’s request.108  In addition, the SEC adopted a new 
rule, 11Ac1-3, which requires annual disclosure to customers of 
a broker’s or dealer’s policies regarding receipt of payments for 
order flow, the market makers to which customer orders are 
routed, and the aggregate amount of payments received for or-
der flow in the previous year.109 
Subsequently, payment for order flow was tested in a number 
of state courts in cases claiming breach of fiduciary duty.  The 
highest courts of New York,110 Minnesota,111 Illinois,112 and 
Pennsylvania,113 as well as two other states’ intermediate appel-
late courts114 found that the 1975 amendments to the Exchange 
Act and SEC disclosure regulations impliedly preempted state 
common law regarding any breach of fiduciary duty involved in 
payment for order flow practices.115  Courts that considered the 
issue of payments for order flow found express preemption prin-
ciples inapplicable because no clear language indicated such a 
congressional preemptive intent.116  The question then became 
whether and what kind of implicit preemption could be inferred.  
In their determinations, courts devoted most of their attention 
to the history of the Exchange Act, as amended in 1975, and the 
evolution of SEC regulations relevant to order flow payments.117  
The Supreme Court of Minnesota and the New York Court of 
  
 107. Id. at 55,010 n.39. 
 108. Id. at 55,010. 
 109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Ac1-3 (2002). 
 110. Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 1996). 
 111. Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1996). 
 112. Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 688 N.E.2d 620 (Ill. 1997). 
 113. Shulick v. PaineWebber & Co., 722 A.2d 148 (Pa. 1998). 
 114. Eirman v. Olde Discount Corp., 697 So. 2d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997); Mickey v. Charles Schwab & Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Cal. App. 1998). 
 115. Some critics argued that these cases holding preemption of state law 
threatened the dual securities regulatory regime Congress intended to pre-
serve.  See, e.g., Anthony Szydlowsky, Comment, Preemption In The Securities 
Industry: A Diminished Standard? 74 ST. JOHN ’S L. REV. 259, 261 (2000) (ar-
guing that Guice was decided incorrectly and created a bad preemption analy-
sis, that Congress explicitly preserved state law causes of action). 
 116. See Dahl, 545 N.W.2d at 923–24. 
 117. See, e.g., id. at 921–24. 
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Appeals were among the earliest to find preemption of state law 
in payment for order flow cases.118   
In Dahl v. Charles Schwab, Minnesota’s highest court re-
jected both the plaintiffs’ and the defendant’s theory of express 
preemption.119  The court held that implicit preemption, specifi-
cally under the obstacle principle, was applicable to the case.120  
The court was very concerned with the national, and even in-
ternational, ramifications of its decision, since payment for or-
der flow was pervasive in the securities industry.121  Although 
complying with both state and federal disclosure requirements 
was not entirely impossible, the court reasoned, it was expen-
sive and difficult for brokers to determine order flow payments 
on a case-by-case basis.122  Usually, such payments were made 
on an aggregate basis, and remuneration could take the form of 
research service or other non-monetary services.  Therefore, 
requiring broker-dealers to disclose the amount of each individ-
ual order flow payment as the plaintiffs urged would operate to 
terminate the practice, which the SEC found to have produced 
more benefits than harms to investors.123  The court concluded 
that since a state law cause of action could frustrate the na-
tional market system objectives of the SEC and Congress, it 
was impliedly preempted.124 
Six months later, in Guice v. Charles Schwab the New York 
Court of Appeals agreed with the Dahl court’s decision.125  That 
court — the highest in New York — performed a similarly thor-
ough analysis of the legislative history of the 1975 amendments 
to the Exchange Act and the SEC’s relevant regulations.126  The 
court emphasized the agency’s acknowledgment that order flow 
payments furthered the purposes of Congress by enhancing 
more efficient and less costly execution of customers’ orders and 
by promoting competition for order executions among all mar-
kets.127  The court maintained that the SEC regulations regard-
  
 118. See supra notes 110–11. 
 119. Dahl, 545 N.W.2d at 922–24. 
 120. Id. at 925. 
 121. See id. at 925–26. 
 122. Id. at 925. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 925–26. 
 125. Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282, 290 (N.Y. 1996).  
 126. See id. at 286–87. 
 127. Id. at 289–90. 
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ing disclosure requirements were less stringent than the appli-
cable state common law.128  A mandatory disclosure of specific 
monetary receipts, in its view, might have a deleterious effect 
on the securities industry.129  Securities broker-dealers, facing 
potentially nationwide class action civil liability, would be com-
pelled to comply with the different disclosure requirements of 
each individual state.  The resulting chaos in the securities 
regulatory regime would frustrate the Congress’s intent of es-
tablishing a nationally “coherent and rational regulatory struc-
ture” under the leadership of the SEC.130  Because state law 
would interfere with the methods by which the federal statute 
was designed to reach a congressional goal, it was preempted.131  
As for the effect of the savings clause, the court interpreted it as 
negating only implied field preemption, not conflict preemp-
tion.132 
Other courts followed the reasoning of the Dahl and Guice 
courts.  The Illinois Supreme Court in Orman v. Charles 
Schwab noted that the SEC in the 1994 amendments to Rule 
10b-10 had “struck a deliberate balance” by requiring broker-
dealers to provide investors with key information while reject-
ing “impractical and burdensome disclosure requirements that 
might compromise the contributions of the practice to market 
competition.”133  Significantly, even though the 1994 amend-
ments to Rule 10b-10 were not in effect at the time of the de-
fendants’ challenged practice, the court found these amend-
ments “instructive as to the scope of the 1977 version of Rule 
10b-10.”134  Citing Guice and Dahl the Orman court held that 
the plaintiffs’ state claims obstructed the purposes and objec-
tives of the Congress and thus were preempted.135 
In Shulick v. PaineWebber, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania also found the Guice court’s rationale convincing.136  The 
majority in Shulick emphasized that the purpose of Rule 10b-10 
was to establish uniformity in the disclosure requirements per-
  
 128. See id. at 290. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 291. 
 132. Id. at 291–92. 
 133. Orman, 688 N.E.2d at 623. 
 134. Id. at 626. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Shulick, 722 A.2d at 151. 
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taining to order flow payments.137  However, as the concurring 
opinion pointed out, the majority’s preemption theory was field 
preemption, differing from Guice’s implied conflict preemp-
tion.138  The majority stated that “federal regulation of the nar-
row subject of disclosure of order flow payments is so thorough 
that we have no difficulty finding the “reasonable inference . . . 
that no room has been left for a state to impose additional re-
quirements.”139  The concurring opinion questioned the sound-
ness of this theory, finding it inappropriate to apply field pre-
emption to a particular issue within securities regulation rather 
than the field as a whole.140 
In McKey v. Charles Schwab, the court adopted the implied 
preemption theory.141 The court admitted that the preemptive 
intent evidenced by the 1994 amendments to Rule 10b-10 and 
the new rule 11Ac1 were not applicable before October 1995, 
the time of the challenged practice.142  However, it found the old 
Rule 10b-10 dispositive.143  The fact that the old rule did not 
specifically mention order flow payments, in the McKey court’s 
view, did not mean that the rule was inapplicable.144  The court 
believed that the old rule clearly evidenced an intent by the 
SEC to “regulate any and all remuneration received by brokers, 
  
 137. See id. at 149. 
 138. See id. at 152 (Cappy, J., concurring). 
 139. Id. at 151. 
 140. Two other states’ intermediate courts also have held federal securities 
law preempted state law by implication.  In Eirman v. Olde, 697 So. 2d 865 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the 
Fourth District found the reasoning of Guice, Dahl, and Orman to be persua-
sive and declined to follow two 1995 cases that reached different decisions.  
See id.; Dumont v. Charles Schwab & Co., 1995 WL 262262 (E.D. La. 1995), 
rev’d, 717 So.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Charles Schwab & Co., 1995 
WL 626522, at *2 (W.D. La. 1995).  See also Gilman v. Wheat, First Securities, 
Inc. 896 F. Supp. 507 (D. Md. 1995).  In Dumont, the U.S. District Court for 
Eastern Louisiana, decided that there was no diversity and no federal ques-
tion because there was no complete federal preemption of the field of securi-
ties.  See Dumont, 1995 WL 262262, at *2.  In Thomas, the Tenth Judicial 
District Court for the Parish of Nachitoches, Louisiana found no express pre-
emption nor inferred congressional preemptive intent.  See Thomas, 1995 WL 
626522, at *2. 
 141. McKey v. Charles Schwab, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 142. Id. at 214–15, 219. 
 143. Id. at 219. 
 144. Id. 
File: KARMEL Base Macro  Final.doc Created on: 4/4/2003 2:32 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:30 AM 
2003] SECURITIES REGULATION U.S. & EU 519 
no matter what the form.”145  In addition, the McKey court 
adopted Guice’s rationale that allowing each state to enforce its 
own disclosure requirements would disturb the promotion of a 
national market system, a goal expressed in the 1975 amend-
ments to the Exchange Act.146   
In short, the majority of the state courts that considered cases 
alleging that payment for order flow was a breach of fiduciary 
duty have held that federal law and regulations impliedly pre-
empted state law.  Except for the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, which found field preemption, all other courts found im-
plicit conflict preemption, because permitting state common law 
cases to go forward would present an obstacle to the national 
market system mandated by the Exchange Act. 
D. The Resurgence of State Securities Regulators 
On May 21, 2002, New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer announced an agreement by Merrill Lunch to enact sig-
nificant and immediate reforms to insulate securities research 
analysts from its investment banking division and to change 
the way analysts are compensated.147  Under this settlement, 
Merrill Lynch agreed, among other things: to sever the link be-
tween compensation for analysts and that for investment bank-
ing; prohibit investment banking input into analysts’ compensa-
tion; to create a new investment review committee responsible 
for approving all research recommendations; to disclose in its 
research reports whether it has received or is entitled to receive 
any compensation from a covered company over the past 12 
months; and to pay a $100 million fine.148  A NASAA task force 
chaired by New York, California, and New Jersey led the inves-
tigation leading to this settlement.149  The agreed upon fine is 
$48 million payable to the New York State Department of Law, 
$50 million to the remaining 49 states, the District of Columbia, 
  
 145. Id. at 219 n.6. 
 146. Id. at 219. 
 147. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. 
State Dep’t of Law, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement 
to Reform Investment Practices (May 21, 2002), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ 
press2002/may/may21a_02.html. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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and Puerto Rico, and $2 million to NASAA.150  This fine is only 
required to be paid, however, if all 50 states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Puerto Rico agree.151  The settlement agreement 
between the New York Attorney General and Merrill Lynch 
goes into considerable detail as to how Merrill Lynch analysts 
will be compensated in the future and the types of disclosures 
research reports will contain.152  This case is a prime  example of 
regulation by prosecution.  Although the settlement does not by 
its terms apply to the entire securities industry, there are simi-
lar ongoing investigations of other firms that could result in 
similar settlements.153   
The case against Merrill Lynch brought by the New York At-
torney General was based on broad and general antifraud pro-
visions of the Martin Act, which prohibit any device scheme or 
artifice to defraud or obtain money by means of any false pre-
tense, representation or promise, fictitious or pretended pur-
chase or sale, any concealment, suppression, fraud, false pre-
tense or false promise in connection with the sale of securities 
or offering investment advice.154  In the New York Attorney 
General’s view, in contrast to the requirements of the federal 
securities laws, no purchase or sale of stock is required, nor are 
intent, reliance or damages required elements of a violation.155  
The gist of the Merrill Lynch case was that the internet re-
search analysts at Merrill Lynch regularly published ratings for 
internet stocks that were misleading because: (1) the ratings in 
many cases did not reflect true opinions; (2) no “reduce” or “sell” 
recommendations were ever issued; and (3) Merrill Lynch did 
  
 150. Agreement Between the Attorney General of the State of N.Y. and 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., May 21, 2002 ¶ 24, available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/merrilllynch/nymerrill52102agr.pdf. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at ¶¶ 5–11, 15. 
 153. See Charles Gasparino, Deals & Deal Makers: Citigroup Suggests Rules 
for Analysts, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2002, at C5; Charles Gasparino, Cleaning 
Up Wall Street: Morgan Stanley Goes to Washington, WALL ST. J., June 21, 
2002, at C1 [hereinafter Gasparino, Cleaning Up Wall Street]. 
 154. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352(i) (McKinney’s 1996). 
 155. Aff. in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Busi-
ness Law 354, at 7, In re Eliot Spitzer (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 2002) 
(No. 02-4015-22), at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/merrilllynch/nyagmerrill 
0402aff.pdf. 
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not disclose that the analysts were acting as quasi-investment 
bankers for the companies rated.156   
The role and conduct of securities analysts during the boom 
years of the 1990s were subject to criticism and scrutiny by se-
curities regulators before the New York Attorney General sued 
Merrill Lynch.  As a result of the congressional hearings after 
the collapse of Enron Corp., the SROs developed new regula-
tions governing analysts’ conflicts of interest, which the SEC 
approved in May 2002.157  The rules prescribe mandatory disclo-
sures about analysts’ conflicts of interest and prohibit analysts 
from receiving compensation directly tied to investment bank-
ing fees.158  After the action by the New York Attorney General, 
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which con-
tains provisions to improve the objectivity of research ana-
lysts.159  The SEC, or SROs under the authorization and direc-
tion of the SEC, are required to adopt rules addressing analysts’ 
conflicts of interest by erecting firewalls between analysts and 
investment bankers and by mandating disclosures of analysts’ 
conflicts of interest.160   
The action by the New York Attorney General against Merrill 
Lynch was controversial.  House Financial Services Committee 
Chairman Michael Oxley criticized the case as duplicative regu-
lation threatening to undermine the national securities regula-
tory regime and that it had the capability of balkanizing the 
securities industry.161  The securities industry generally favors 
  
 156. Id. at 3. 
 157. See SEC Gives Nod to Analyst Rules Aimed at Boosting Independence, 
34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 749 (May 13, 2002); Self-Regulatory 
Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NASD and 
NYSE, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968-01 
(May 15, 2002). 
 158. See NYSE Rule 472, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2472 (1995) (amended); 
NASD Rule 2210, N.A.S.D. Manual, at 4171–80 (new).  See also Order Ap-
proving Proposed Rule Changes and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Ac-
celerated Approval, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968 
(May 16, 2002). 
 159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 160. Id. § 501(a). 
 161. See Press Release, House Comm. on Financial Services, Oxley Com-
ments on Spitzer Testimony (June 26, 2002), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp.  See also Spitzer Spars With Ox-
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national regulation rather than regulation by 50 states.  The 
Securities Industry Association took the position that “the U.S. 
needs a national securities framework from which to work, not 
a patchwork.”162  Morgan Stanley lobbied to attach a provision 
preempting state securities regulators from examining securi-
ties analysts’ conflicts of interest, but such a provision was not 
included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.163  The new activ-
ism of state prosecutors against business is widespread and — 
as is exhibited by the Merrill Lynch case — has its roots in local 
governments’ efforts to protect consumers against the deregula-
tory initiatives of the Reagan administration.164  Defenders of 
the case against Merrill Lynch claim that the states have 
stepped in to fill the void left by weak federal regulation.165  
Eliot Spitzer, in justifying his activism, claimed that “the SEC 
was not doing enough.”166   
Within a year following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, the SEC is required to adopt or compel the SROs to adopt 
new regulations governing the conduct of secur ities analysts.167  
Although Congress did not directly preempt state action against 
securities analysts, issues of implied or field preemption could 
arise as a result of disparities between state securities regula-
tors’ views of analysts’ conflicts and those of the SEC.  Fur-
thermore, not all state securities regulators agree with Spitzer’s 
approach; therefore, there could be fragmentation and inconsis-
tency in state securities regulation.168   
The battle between the SEC and NASAA, as is true of many 
battles over national versus state or federal regulation, is politi-
  
ley, Baker After Urging Tough Conflict Rules, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 26, at 1042 (July 1, 2002). 
 162. See Susanne Craig, Local Enforcers Gain Clout on Street, WALL ST. J., 
June 21, 2002, at C1. 
 163. See Gasparino, Cleaning Up Wall Street, supra note 153. 
 164. See Russell Gold & Andrew Caffrey, United Crime Busters,  WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 1, 2002, at B1. 
 165. See Craig, supra note 162. 
 166. New Cops on the Beat, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 2002, at 77, 78.  It 
appears that the SEC did not cooperate with the New York Attorney General’s 
investigation.  See Michael Schroeder, SEC Welcomes Prosecutions, WALL ST. 
J., June 11, 2002, at A2. 
 167. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (adding § 15D to 
the Exchange Act). 
 168. See Matt Fleisher-Black, Spitzer Faces Hurdle Over Merrill Deal, N.Y. 
L.J., July 22, 2002, at 1; Gold & Caffey, supra note 164. 
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cal and philosophical.  It may also become a matter of law for 
the courts to address.  Under the payment for order flow cases, 
it would not be difficult to find conflict or even field preemption 
if SEC or SRO rulemaking results in regulations that take a 
different approach from the settlement made between Merrill 
Lynch and the New York Attorney General.  But the payment 
for order flow cases were private actions for damages.  A court 
might be reluctant to apply this analysis to prosecutions by a 
state attorney general .  Further, if the conflict that arises is 
between regulatory action by a state official and a rule of an 
SRO, is the conflict a federal constitutional conflict?  Can an 
SRO rule trump state law in all cases where the regulation was 
mandated by a federal statute and approved by the SEC? 169 
In addition, where a state action brought either by a prosecu-
tor or a private plaintiff is instituted as a broad statutory or 
common law antifraud claim, it is difficult to find preemption 
unless the SEC has acted by adopting detailed regulations as it 
did with respect to payments for order flow.  In Zuri-Invest AG 
v. NatWest Finance, Inc. a federal district court held that a 
state fraud action was not preempted by the federal securities 
laws, including the NSMIA.170  Rather, the primary purpose of 
the NSMIA was to preempt state blue-sky laws regulating the 
registration and underwriting of securities.  It did not preclude 
states from regulating fraudulent conduct or extinguish state 
  
 169. It may be relevant to note that all SEC registered broker-dealers are 
required by federal law to join the NASD.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 
15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (2000).  See also Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 
F.2d 1564, 1573, 1574 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).  Further, the NASD was created 
pursuant to federal authorization in 1938.  The Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. 
No. 719, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000)) (adding § 15A to 
the Exchange Act of 1934).  In a pending case, SROs are seeking to invalidate 
disclosure rules of the Judicial Council of California that conflict with rules 
for SRO arbitrators.  See NYSE Sue to Block California Rules in Securities 
Arbitrations; Preemption Cited, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1296 
(Aug. 5, 2002). 
 170. 177 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  See also IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. 
Gleacher NatWest Corp., 2002 WL 373455 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2002); Gabriel 
Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 
Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000).  But see Myers v. Merrill Lynch, 1999 WL 696082, at *8–10 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 23, 1999), aff’d, 249 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2001). 
File: KARMEL Base Macro  Final.doc Created on:  4/4/2003 2:32 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:30 AM 
524 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
claims based on fraud.171  Similar issues have  arisen under the 
SLUSA.172   
III. FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES 
LAW IN THE EU 
A. Sources of Law 
The EU is not a national federal system, but rather a federa-
tion by treaty of member nations for limited purposes.  The EU 
aspires to reach certain goals expressed in the various treaties 
that serve as the legal foundation for the EU173 through legal 
actions initiated by the European Commission (“Commission”), 
which may take the form of directives or regulations.174  Such 
  
 171. See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-622 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3877, 3896 (“Committee’s intention not to alter . . . State statutory or common 
law with respect to fraud or deceit . . . .”). 
 172. See Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2002) (state con-
tract claim not preempted by SLUSA). 
 173. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY , Nov. 10, 1997, 
O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997), arts. 9, 99, 105, 108 (as in effect 1957) (now arts. 46, 
103, 105, 107) [hereinafter EC TREATY].  The Treaty on European Union sig-
nificantly amended the earlier treaties and set forth the framework for mone-
tary and fiscal union and the establishment of the European Central Bank.  
TEU OR MAASTRICHT TREATY: TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (EU), Feb. 7, 1992, 
1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253. 
  The founding treaties leading to the establishment of EU include: 
ESCS or PARIS TREATY: TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL 
COMMUNITY , Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; EEC or TREATY OF ROME: 
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 3; EAEC or EURATOM Treaty: TREATY ESTABLISHING THE 
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY , Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167; 
MERGER TREATY: TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Apr. 8, 1965, 1967 J.O. 152/1 (in 
French); SEA: SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 
I.L.M. 506 (an act modifying the basic treaties); TEU OR MAASTRICHT TREATY: 
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (EU), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 
253; TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE 
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED 
ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).  
 174. The European Commission is composed of twenty Commissioners, two 
from each of the five largest member states, and one from each of the smaller 
states, appointed by their respective national governments.  EC TREATY, art. 
157.  Since directives are given legal effect only through national laws, rights 
and duties are not conferred on individuals by a directive.  Id. art. 189.  Some-
times, however, a member state will be held liable for its failure to timely 
adopt a directive.  Id. art. 171.  See Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt 
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legislation is then sent to the European Parliament175 and 
adopted by the Council of Ministers.176  Directives are not gen-
erally self operating but must be implemented through the na-
tional laws of the various member states, whereas regulations 
are directly applicable throughout the EU.  In addition, the pro-
visions of the treaties which govern the EU directly apply to the 
member states.  The EU does not have any treaty provision 
comparable to the Supremacy Clause, so preemption of national 
law is not possible, but federal enforcement mechanisms do ex-
ist. 
The Commission can, at the request of a member state, bring 
an action against another member for failing to adopt a law im-
plementing a directive, or for having legislation that is contrary 
to a directive, regulation or treaty provision.  Also, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice may strike down a national law as con-
trary to a treaty provision in a case instituted by the Commis-
sion or by one member state against another.177  Although the 
EU does have some administrative bodies, with the exception of 
the European Central Bank, these agencies do not have regula-
tory powers comparable to U.S. federal agencies such as the 
SEC.178   
The primary thrust of the European Economic Community 
Treaty (“EEC Treaty”) was to create a single European eco-
nomic market, primarily through harmonization and mutual 
recognition of national laws providing for the free movement of 
goods, services, people and capital.  The Treaty of the European 
Union (“TEU”) further advanced economic integration through 
  
Traustein, [1970] E.C.R. 825.  The direct applicability of regulations is based 
on Article 249 of the EC Treaty. 
 175. The TEU changed the power of Parliament with respect to legislation 
from purely advisory to one of cooperation and co-decision.  See EC TREATY, 
supra note 173, arts. 249, 251, 252 (as in effect 1957) (now arts. 189, 189b, 
189c).   Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the peo-
ples of Europe.  Id. art. 190 (now art. 138). 
 176. The Council of Ministers is composed of one national representative 
from each member state and has the capacity to enact EU legislation and is 
the principal decision making body of the Union.  Id. arts. 202, 203 (now arts. 
145, 146). 
 177. Id. arts. 226, 227 (now arts. 169, 170).  See also Case C-483/99, Re 
Golden Shares: Commission v. French Republic, 2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002). 
 178. See Andrea M. Corcoran & Terry L. Hart, The Regulation of Cross Bor-
der Financial Services in the EU Internal Market, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 221, 
232–33 (2002). 
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the establishment of a common European currency and central 
bank and moved beyond economic union with the introduction 
of the concept of European citizenship, but then retreated from 
federalism by adopting the principle of subsidiarity.179  It has 
been argued that this was a political reaction against the use of 
mutual recognition as a smoke screen for deregulation at a na-
tional level.180  The subsidiarity principle requires EU action to 
be taken only where the objectives of the treaties cannot be 
adequately achieved at a national level and can be better 
achieved by EU action.  However, these tests apply only when 
the EU acts outside its exclusive competence.  This attempt at 
allocating power between member states and the EU has not 
resolved the ambiguities of shared legal power.181 
B. Incomplete Harmonization of Securities Regulation 
The Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundation for the Euro-
pean Economic Communities (“EEC”) in 1957, was designed to 
remove all restrictions on the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital within the EU.182  This plan was furthered 
by the EC White Paper of 1985, which set forth a program for 
creating a single European market by 1992.  The single market 
was envisioned as expansive and flexible in order to ensure that 
resources, including capital and investment, would flow into the 
areas of greatest economic advantage.183  National regulators 
would continue to play a supervisory role, but financial services 
would be liberalized by putting into effect EU-wide minimum 
standards that would supersede former national regulations.184  
A timetable for the adoption of securities law directives was 
included in the White Paper.185  The White Paper was then im-
plemented by the Single European Act amendments to the 
Treaty of Rome, which encouraged and facilitated the use of 
  
 179. EC TREATY, supra note 173, arts. 4, 5, 8, at 17–22. 
 180. See Imelda Maher, Legislative Review by the EC Commission, in NEW 
LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 235, 236 (Jo Shaw & Gillian Moore eds., 
1995). 
 181. Id. at 237. 
 182. EC TREATY, supra note 173. 
 183. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal 
Market:  White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, 
COM(83)310 final at 8 [hereinafter White Paper]. 
 184. Id. at 103. 
 185. Id. Annex, at 26–27. 
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directives to harmonize the laws of Member States.186  The TEU 
or Maastrict Treaty which came into effect in 1993 then pro-
vided for an economic and monetary union including a common 
currency.187  The objective of these efforts was to remove techni-
cal barriers, which either added costs or restricted entry into 
particular markets, thereby impeding the free movement of 
goods, services, persons and capital.   
The Commission recognized that abolition of anticompetitive 
practices was not sufficient to create a common financial mar-
ket.  There was a need for EU-wide rules to underpin the stabil-
ity of the financial system and to provide a satisfactory level of 
protection for consumers.  The mechanism chosen for integra-
tion of the financial markets was a series of directives to har-
monize essential standards throughout the EU and to enable 
financial regulators to practice home country control, but oblige 
them to honor principles of mutual recognition.  Four groups of 
financial law directives were adopted relating to the efforts to 
develop a single securities market in the EU.  These were direc-
tives on financial disclosure, directives covering public securi-
ties offerings and stock exchange listings, directives regulating 
trading markets, and directives regulating financial intermedi-
aries. 
As a result of these directives, securities regulation has been 
partially but incompletely harmonized.  There still is not an 
integrated European capital market enabling issuers to float 
public offerings or savers to invest and trade across national 
borders in a single market.188  The author previously advocated 
the creation of a European Securities Commission to achieve 
the integration of European capital markets comparable to the 
integration of European monetary markets that was achieved 
by the creation of the euro and the European Central Bank.189  
Other commentators have similarly argued in favor of a Euro-
  
 186. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1987). 
 187. TEU, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992). 
 188. Financial Services: Implementing the Framework For Financial Mar-
kets: Action Plan, COM(99)232 final at 6 [hereinafter Financial Services Ac-
tion Plan]. 
 189. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commis-
sion, 38 COLUM . J. TRANSNAT’L L. 9 (1992). 
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pean Securities Commission,190 while some others have either 
opposed the idea, or argued that the time is not ripe for such a 
development.191 
There is a serious question as to whether a European Securi-
ties Commission could be organized under existing treaty provi-
sions.  Although power to create such a Commission could be 
impliedly found in the existing provisions, an amendment to the 
TEU probably would be necessary.192  The establishment of the 
European Central Bank required an amendment to the EC 
treaty, and since there has been strenuous objection from the 
British to a European Securities Commission, it is unlikely that 
a well constructed securities commission could be established 
without a treaty amendment.193 
As a result of the adoption of several capital markets direc-
tives, especially the Investment Services Directive (“ISD”)194 
and the Insider Dealing Directive,195 and in response to market-
place and political developments, new national government se-
curities regulators were created in some European countries 
that previously lacked such regulators.196  Other national regu-
  
 190. See  Gilles Thieffry, The Case for a European Securities Commission, in 
REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 211, 231 
(Eilís Ferran & Charles A.E. Goodhart  eds., 2001). 
 191. See Karel Lannoo, Does Europe Need an SEC? Securities Market 
Regulation in the EU (1996), available at www.ecmi.com (last visited Mar. 20, 
2003); BENN STEIL & ERICK BERGLOF, THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: THE 
STATE OF THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MILLENNIUM 136 (1996); Andrew 
Whittaker, A European Law for Regulated Markets? Some Personal Views , in 
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND 
BEYOND 269, 273 (Guido Ferrarini  ed., 1998).  See also Eddy Wymeersch, 
Regulating European Markets: The Harmonization of Securities Regulation in 
Europe in the New Trading Environment, in REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AND MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 189, 192–93. 
 192. See Thieffry, supra note 190, at 222–23; Eddy Wymeersch, From Har-
monization to Integration in the European Securities Markets, 3 J. CORP. L. &  
SEC. REG. 1 (1981). 
 193. See Thieffry supra note 190, at n.41. 
 194. Council Directive 93/22 of 10 May 1993 on Investment in Services in 
the Securities Field, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27, as amended by corrigendums to 
93/22, 1993 O.J. (L 170) 32, 1993 O.J. (L 194) 27. 
 195. Council Directive No. 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30. 
 196. See Stephen J. Leacock, In Search of a Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider 
Trading in International Securities Markets By the Reform of Insider Trading 
Laws Under European Council Directive 89/592, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
51, 55 (1995).  Germany did not have a federal securities regulator until it was 
required to do so to implement the Insider Dealing Directive.  Id. at 62–63.  
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lators were reformed and securities regulation became more 
centralized.197  National regulators can be a force for further 
harmonization, but to some extent their interests diverge, be-
cause established national securities commissions do not wish 
to cede power to one another or to a federal securities commis-
sion. 
Although securities regulation in Europe has generally im-
proved since the White Paper and Single European Act 1992 
deadline, dissatisfaction with the pace of capital markets inte-
gration in Europe led to the Financial Services Act Plan198 in 
1999 and the Lamfalussy Report199 in 2001.  The Financial Ser-
vices Action Plan, which was two years in the making, was an 
aspirational program by the European Commission for more 
rapid progress toward a single financial market.200  It was 
prompted by a sense that despite the introduction of the euro, 
the capital markets in Europe had remained fragmented.  It set 
forth as strategic objectives the development of a single EU 
wholesale market where, among other things, capital could be 
raised on an EU-wide basis and EU companies would produce a 
single set of financial statements, open and secure retail mar-
kets, and state of the art prudential rules and supervision.201 
The Commission recognized that an overhaul of the way the 
EU developed financial services legislation was needed to 
  
The Netherlands established the Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Markets on March 1, 2002 to oversee the entire financial market sector.  See  
News: STE becomes Authority for the Financial Markets (Feb. 28, 2002), at 
http://www.autoriteit-fm.nl/. 
 197. On December 1, 2001, the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority became 
a single regulator through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  See 
Financial Services Authority, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ (last modified Sept. 5, 
2002).  On July 2, 1996 France’s Commission des Opérations de Bourse was 
given wider powers (sanctioning ability, etc.).  See Commission des Opérations 
de Bourse, at http://www.cob.fr/cobgb/.  Germany’s Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin) took over the function of the earlier 
BAWe on May 1, 2002 and has much more regulatory power than before.  See 
BAFin, at http://www.bawe.de/english/index_re_e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 
2003). 
 198. Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 188. 
 199. THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
WISE MEN ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (2001), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/ 
lamfalussyen.pdf. [hereinafter LAMFALUSSY REPORT].  
 200. Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 188, at 3–4. 
 201. Id. at 22–28. 
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achieve these goals.  A European Securities Commission was 
not recommended but other mechanisms were suggested to 
avoid piecemeal and reactive protracted decision-making and 
the inflexibility of regulation by directives.202  One suggestion 
was a high level forum to consult with affected interest groups 
and to forge a consensus between national financial regulators 
on emerging challenges.203  Another suggestion was acceleration 
of co-decision procedures of the European Parliament.204  Im-
plementation of these suggestions would impinge on the Com-
mission’s legal right of initiative and the European Parliament’s 
hard-won right of the co-decision, and the latter proved politi-
cally troublesome. 
In response to the Financial Services Action Plan, the EcoFin 
Council appointed a Committee of Wise Men under the Chair-
manship of Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy, which issued its final 
report on February 15, 2001.205  The Report sets forth the bene-
fits of capital market integration, a long litany of areas in which 
necessary European rules governing the capital markets are 
needed, and reasons why the regulatory process is too slow, too 
rigid, produces ambiguous regulations, and fails to distinguish 
between core principles and day-to-day implementing rules.206  
Blame was assigned to the legislative process itself, especially 
co-decision procedures and subsidiarity principles.207  The Lam-
falussy Report did not recommend the creation of a European 
Securities Commission, but rather the establishment of two 
new committees — an EU Securities Committee, with high level 
members appointed by EU member states, and an EU Securi-
ties Regulators Committee, composed of the heads of member 
state securities regulators.  The Lamfalussy Report took a four-
tiered approach to regulatory reform:208  (1) framework princ i-
ples would continue to be decided by normal EU legislative pro-
cedures; (2) the two new Committees would assist the Commis-
sion in implementing the framework principles; (3) enhanced 
cooperation and networking among EU securities regulators 
  
 202. Id. at 16. 
 203. Id. at 16–17. 
 204. Id. at 17–18. 
 205. LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 199, at 189. 
 206. Id. at 9–15. 
 207. Id. at 13–14. 
 208. Id. at 19, 30–33. 
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would lead to common implementing standards; and (4) the 
European Commission would be prodded to engage in strength-
ened enforcement of community law.209  The Lamfalussy Report 
also recommended a greater use of regulations rather than di-
rectives.210 
Although the Lamfalussy Report was welcomed by the finan-
cial community, it was not so well received by the European 
Parliament, which feared its co-equal legislative powers would 
be undermined.  After a delay of almost a year, however, the 
European Parliament agreed to have a lesser say on secondary 
securities legislation and the EU Securities Committee came 
into existence.211  In addition, the Committee of European Secu-
rities Regulators (“CESR”) was constituted as a successor to the 
Federation of European Securities Commissions (“FESCO”).212 
A report by the European Commission was issued in June 
2002 at the half-way stage of the implementation timetable for 
the Financial Services Action Plan.213  Although of the forty-two 
original measures in the plan twenty-six have been completed, 
important initiatives, such as updating the regular reporting 
requirement for raising capital on an EU wide basis, amending 
the ISD, and a directive on takeover bids, have not been 
achieved.214  Regulation accomplished, however, one very impor-
tant achievement.  As of 2005, all listed EU companies will be 
required to report their financial results according to interna-
tional accounting standards.215 
It remains to be seen whether harmonization of securities 
laws and regulations and integration of the European capital 
markets will be accomplished by way of the fast track proce-
dures recommended in the Lamfalussy Report.  Also, it is diffi-
  
 209. Id. at 19. 
 210. Id. at 26. 
 211. See generally Karel Lannoo & Mattias Levin, Securities Market Legis-
lative Procedures in the EU (CEPS) (on file with author).  See also Commission 
of the European Communities, Commission Decision Establishing the Euro-
pean Securities Committee, COM(2001)1493 final. 
 212. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision 
Establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, 
COM(2001)1501 final.  See also Corcoran & Hart, supra note 178, at 281–82. 
 213. European Commission, Financial Services: An Improving Climate — 
But Quite Some Way to Go, COM(02)267 at 2, available at http://europa.eu. 
int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/actionplan/index.htm. 
 214. Id. at 10. 
 215. Id. at 4. 
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cult to predict how the current world wide stock market turmoil 
will impact both U.S. and EU securities regulation.  As the 
Lamfalussy Report itself pointed out, a failure of its recom-
mended approach could lead to a treaty amendment creating a 
single EU regulatory authority for financial services.216 
IV. TAKEOVER REGULATION 
A. Impasse in the U.S. 
A conflict between federal and state interests with respect to 
securities regulation arises when there is a tender offer to pur-
chase the shares of a target corporation.  This collision of law 
may also be described as a conflict between securities law and 
corporation law.  In a tender offer for cash (or notes),217 the 
shareholders of the target company are deprived of any going 
forward interest in the profits of the target company; and their 
rights as shareholders cease.  If the tender offer is for securities 
of the bidder, or results in a merger with the bidder, then the 
shareholders of the target company become the shareholders of 
a larger combined enterprise.  In either event, the tender offer 
is an urgent, material transaction affecting the very existence of 
the target company.218  Further, although shareholders gener-
ally benefit economically from a takeover because they enjoy a 
premium for control, other corporate constituencies, particu-
larly management and labor, are likely to be disadvantaged by 
a takeover.219 
In 1968, the U.S. Congress passed the Williams Act regulat-
ing takeovers, adding Sections 13(d) and 14(e) to the Exchange 
Act.220  Although a stated purpose of the Williams Act was to 
maintain neutrality between the bidder and target in a tender 
offer contest,221 the statute was intended to protect investors 
  
 216. Thieffry, supra note 190, at 233. 
 217. In the U.S., takeovers generally are for cash; in the U.K., due to tax 
implications, they are generally for notes.  This difference leads to a conflict 
between U.S. and U.K. law concerning takeovers.  See Cross-Border Tender 
Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-7611, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,136, n.41 (Dec. 15, 1998) 
 218. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 219. Bondholders may also be disadvantaged.  See Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 906 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 220. See supra note 37. 
 221. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
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confronted by a takeover bid.  It accomplished this objective by 
requiring certain disclosure by the bidder concerning a tender 
offer and regulating the manner in which a tender offer is con-
ducted.222  Very generally, many commentators and the SEC 
were persuaded that takeovers were not only good for share-
holders, but also that control contests were a check on man-
agement, which weeded out corporate leaders who were not ef-
fective.223 
Managements threatened by hostile takeovers developed a 
variety of defense mechanisms, including poison pills, selling 
the crown jewels, staggered boards, control clauses, and golden 
parachutes.  These mechanisms were generally upheld under 
state corporate law as appropriate unless a corporation was in 
effect put up for sale by management.224  Efforts to invalidate 
anti-takeover mechanisms through suits in the federal courts 
under the Williams Act failed because the U.S. Supreme Court 
viewed these defenses as matters of internal corporate man-
agement covered by state corporate law so long as full disclo-
sure was made.225  Although the SEC was able to adopt rules 
under the Williams Act to prohibit some of the defenses permit-
ted by state corporate law,226 when the SEC attempted to out-
law the potent anti-takeover device of lesser voting shares for 
public stockholders, the D.C. Circuit Court struck down the 
SEC’s rule as being beyond its statutory authority.227 
  
 222. See Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-7760, 70 S.E.C. Docket 2229 (Oct. 22, 1999). 
 223. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allan Ferrell, A New Approach to 
Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 159 (2001); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.  REV. 
1028 (1982); William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repel-
lents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, A.B.F. RES. J.  
341, 347–52 (1983); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role for 
a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV . L. REV. 
1161 (1981); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 
VA. L. REV. 111 (1987). 
 224. See Paramount Comm. Inc. v. Times Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. 
Household Int’l. Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 225. See Schreiber v. Burlington N. Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Indus. 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 226. See, e.g., All Holders and Best Price Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 
(1987) (upheld in Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 227. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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In addition to the conflicts between the Williams Act and 
state corporate law that were fought out in state and federal 
courts, management and labor groups were able to persuade 
state legislatures to pass anti-takeover statutes.  Early statutes 
either unduly delayed the takeover process or permitted state 
blue-sky commissioners to conclude that takeovers were unfair.  
Such a statute was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as 
unconstitutional.228  Later state statutes, which imposed delays 
in the tender offer process, prohibited control share merger 
transactions for a period of years, or endorsed the consideration 
by corporate managers of non-shareholder constituencies in 
control contests, were upheld by the federal courts.229 
The refusal of the federal courts to invalidate most state anti-
takeover legislation, or to endorse SEC efforts to curb takeover 
defenses, left the task of articulating how management should 
behave in control contests to the state courts.  Because a major-
ity of U.S. public corporations are incorporated in Delaware, 
decisions by the Delaware state courts became determinative of 
how the relevant law developed.230  The only national standard 
applicable to contests for corporate control other than the dis-
closure and specific procedural provisions of the Williams Act 
are stock exchange listing standards, which have an ambiguous 
legal footing.  Although they originated in state contract laws, 
they are SRO “rules” under the Exchange Act, subject to SEC 
review and approval.231 
Most academics have criticized the impasse that developed 
between federal and state law with regard to takeovers, believ-
ing that takeovers are important mechanisms for protecting 
shareholders and disciplining corporate managers.232  But the 
Main Street interests that question the wisdom of encouraging 
hostile takeovers are probably at least as powerful as the Wall 
  
 228. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 229. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); 
Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).  See Roberta S. Karmel, The Duty of Direc-
tors to Non-Shareholder Constituencies in Control Transactions, 25 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 61, 66–70 (1990). 
 230. See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of 
Directors in American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 339 (1998). 
 231. See ABA, Market Structure Report , supra note 4, at 1516–27. 
 232. See Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative 
Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 375–78 (1996). 
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Street interests favoring hostile takeovers.  Therefore it is 
unlikely that state anti-takeover statutes or state corporate law 
giving corporate management considerable leeway in respond-
ing to takeover bids will be overturned, unless economic devel-
opments create a new consensus with respect to contests for 
corporate control.233 
B. Impasse in Europe 
Like the U.S., the EU has thus far been unable to reconcile 
the political and legal interests that clash in the takeover 
arena.  On July 4, 2001, a twelve year effort by the European 
Commission to adopt an EU Takeover Directive failed by a tie 
vote of 273-273 in the European Parliament.234  This was a seri-
ous set-back for economic liberalization and integration of the 
European capital markets.  The Takeover Directive was mired 
in politics from its inception and its various iterations and final 
defeat over the past decade illustrate the problems of develop-
ing a single European capital market.  
In the U.K., management of corporations works primarily for 
the benefit of shareholders; whereas, on the continent, man-
agement and directors owe equal loyalty to shareholder claims 
and those of creditors and labor.  This fact accounts for the key 
differences in business environments for hostile takeovers in 
the U.K. and on the continent, and resulted in impediments to 
the adoption of the Takeover Directive.235  Hostile takeovers are 
common in London and are regulated by the Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers, a self-regulatory body that operates pursu-
ant to the City Code on Takeover and Mergers (“City Code”).  
The two most important principles in the City Code are that the 
shareholders of an offeree company must decide whether or not 
an offer should succeed, and that all equity holders must be 
treated equally.  In addition, after an offer is communicated to 
the board, or even when a board has reason to believe an offer is 
imminent, the offeree board is prohibited from taking any ac-
tion without the approval of shareholders at a general meeting 
“which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frus-
  
 233. See Pinto, supra note 230, at n.59. 
 234. See Pull up the Drawbridge, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2001, at 67. 
 235. See Ingrid Depser, Amended EC Proposal for a 13th Council Directive 
on Company Law Concerning Takeovers and Other General Bids , 19 INT ’L BUS. 
LAW. 483, 484 (1991). 
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trated or in the shareholders being denied an opportunity to 
decide on its merits.”236  The initial draft of the Thirteenth Di-
rective on Company Law, patterned after the City Code to some 
extent, was concerned with the equal treatment of the parties 
involved in takeovers and the transparency of corporate take-
overs while a takeover bid was in progress.237   
Since capital formation depends upon equity capital in the 
U.K. there is a constant monitoring of management perform-
ance, protection of minority shareholders, and efficient resource 
allocation.  In contrast, in Germany and in other continental 
states, management is given a long-term mandate, and its first 
duty is to the business and then to the employees and the com-
pany’s bankers.  Further, in Germany there is stable and 
knowledgeable business ownership with close ties to banks.  
Given this difference, the British regarded takeovers as the ul-
timate discipline over bad management, whereas the Germans 
considered hostile bids as inimical to the three ingredients of 
their post-war success — management’s ability to take a long-
term view, harmonious labor relations, and the disciplinary 
function of German banks.  Accordingly, German law counte-
nanced numerous barriers to hostile takeovers.238  The Germans 
and other continentals opposed the Thirteenth Directive, be-
cause they believed it adopted the pro-takeover underpinnings 
of the U.K. system.  The British also opposed it, because they 
did not wish to see their self-regulatory system be replaced by a 
statutory system. 
However, the Commission insisted that there was a need to 
facilitate the restructuring of European companies to meet in-
ternational competition, so an amended version of the Thir-
teenth Directive was put forth.239  By this time, takeover activ-
ity had increased somewhat and the need for shareholder pro-
  
 236. PANEL ON TAKEOVER AND MERGERS , THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF SHARES 7 
(3d ed. 1990). 
 237. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concern-
ing Takeover and Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8.  There was a provi-
sion for a mandatory bid once a threshold position of one-third of the voting 
shares was acquired.  Also, controlling target-company shareholders would 
have been required to act in the interests of all shareholders by not frustrat-
ing the bid. 
 238. See Depser, supra note 235, at 484. 
 239. 1990 O.J. (C 240) 9. 
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tection had become more apparent.240  The amended Thirteenth 
Directive required each Member State to designate a supervi-
sory authority to put it into effect, a requirement that previ-
ously had been included in the EU Insider Trading Directive.241  
There was also provision for mutual recognition.242  The 
amended Thirteenth Directive fared no better, however, in 
achieving acceptance and a consensus in favor of adopting it, 
than the original proposed directive.  In 1997, a new and 
streamlined proposal for a takeover directive was put forward 
by the Commission.243 This proposal took into account the sub-
sidiarity principle and left member states some latitude in de-
ciding how to achieve the goals of the directive.  The directive 
would have applied to a company’s securities traded on a regu-
lated market governed by the law of an EU member state.  
Nevertheless, the general principles of the amended Thirteenth 
Directive that would have been followed in national law were 
unchanged.244   
  
 240. See Lois Moore, The EC’s Proposed Takeover Directives, N.Y. L.J., May 
28, 1991, at 1.   
 241. The supervisory authorities were then given the mandate to assure, 
among other things, that holders of securities in the target company would be 
treated equally; target company shareholders would have time and informa-
tion to reach an informed decision on the bid and the target company board 
would not frustrate the bid.  Mandatory bid provisions and mandated disclo-
sure in offering documents also were specified.  See Amended Commission 
Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company law Concerning 
Takeover and Other General Bids, art. 6, 1989 O.J. (C 240) 7, 15. 
 242. See id. art. 6(3). 
 243. See Amended Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth European Parlia-
ment and Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids, 1997 
O.J. (C 378) 10. 
 244. The general principles were: (1) holders of securities in target compa-
nies who are in the same position must be treated equally; (2) the addressees 
of a bid must have sufficient time and information to enable them to reach a 
properly informed decision; (3) the board of an offeree company must act in 
the interests of the company as a whole; (4) false markets must not be created 
in the securities of companies involved in a bid; and (5) target companies must 
not be hindered in the conduct of their business beyond a reasonable time.  
See Amended Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive, art. 5, 
1997 O.J. (C 378) 15.  Further, the establishment of national rules would have 
been necessary in order to make public a decision to bid once the supervisory 
authority and target company were notified and the bidder would have been 
required to draft a disclosure document and submit it to the supervisory au-
thority.  Id. art. 6, at 16–17.  The Directive recognized that prompt an-
nouncement of an intention to launch a takeover bid reduces opportunities for 
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The twice amended directive remained an anathema to the 
British, who feared that, despite the recognition of the Takeover 
Panel as a proper supervisory authority, it would change the 
workings of the Panel by tangling its operations in endless legal 
challenges.245  When the British finally agreed to support it, the 
Directive became mired in a spat between Britain and Spain 
over Gibraltar. In the meantime, pressure in Europe grew to 
harmonize an array of takeover laws that had been adopted in 
the major European economies and had provisions that differed 
widely.  Some were based on shareholder protection principles.  
Others were more friendly to target managements by permit-
ting defense mechanisms.246  Then, in April 2001, just as the 
Council and the European Parliament were on the verge of 
reaching an agreement to reconcile their differences over the 
Takeover Directive, Germany withdrew its support for the 
measure because of its concerns that U.S. companies would 
prey on German companies.247  Until this time, all fifteen EU 
member states had agreed that company boards would be re-
quired to get shareholder approval before adopting poison pills, 
but Germany wanted to water down this provision and let man-
agement decide on poison pills.248  It was pressure from German 
companies, which, following the hostile takeover of Mannes-
mannröhren-Werke AG by Vodafone, feared takeovers of com-
panies such as Volkswagen, that ultimately defeated the Take-
over Directive in the European Parliament, where a tie vote 
constitutes a veto, since a majority vote is required to approve a 
directive. 
  
insider trading.  Id. art. 7, at 17.  The target company board would have been 
prohibited from taking action to affect the success of the bid after receiving 
notification of the bid.  Id. art. 8, at 17–18.  Rules would have had to have 
been published on withdrawal or nullity of bids, revision of bids, treatment of 
competing bids, and disclosure of the outcome.  Id. art. 9, at 18.  Whether 
mandatory bids would have been required at any point was left to the laws of 
the Member States.  Id. art. 10, at 18. 
 245. See More Talks on Defining Takeover Bids Directive, EUR. REP., Jan. 
19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 8305668; Euro-Takeovers, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
1997, at 17. 
 246. See Anita Raghavan & Thomas Kamm, Pressure Grows to Unify 
Europe’s Takeover Laws, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1999, at A28. 
 247. See EU Expects Corporate Takeover Directive To Pass Despite Loss of 
German Backing, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 683 (May 7, 2001). 
 248. See Paul Meller, Europe Plan on Mergers Hits a Snag, N.Y. TIMES, May 
3, 2001, at W1. 
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This was not the end of the story, however.  A week after the 
defeat of the Takeover Directive, the German government ap-
proved a draft takeover law intended to provide options for tar-
get companies to defend against hostile takeovers, and stated 
that it intended to continue pushing for an EU directive on 
takeovers.249  After several drafts were presented, a new Ger-
man Takeover Act, offering legal rules generally in line with 
international standards and providing for effective enforcement, 
became effective on January 1, 2002.250  As a result, German 
managements are now more limited in adopting defensive 
measures to unwelcome takeovers, but they will continue to 
have more latitude in erecting barriers to takeovers than man-
agements of U.K. companies.251 
In addition, the Commission continued to push for an EU-
wide takeover regime. It acted on two fronts.  First, it set up a 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts (“High Level 
Group”) to provide advice on issues related to pan-European 
rules for takeover bids.252  Second, it successfully prosecuted a 
case invalidating France’s golden share in Société National Elf-
Aquitaine.253  These two developments have laid the foundation 
for a new EU Takeover Directive which may eventually be 
adopted. 
The High Level Group determined that takeover bids are ba-
sically beneficial.  It endorsed a level playing field for takeovers, 
that is, takeover bids should be undertaken with a similar ex-
pectation of success across the EU, and shareholders should in 
all member states have corresponding opportunities to tender 
their shares.254  The High Level Group set forth two principles 
for achieving a level playing field.  First, in the event of a take-
  
 249. See Cabinet Adopts Draft Takeover Law Meant to Protect Target Com-
panies, 7 World Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 5 (July 2001). 
 250. See Hans-Michael Giesen, The New German Public Takeover Law, 31 
INT’L L. NEWS 1, 23 (2002). 
 251. Id. at 22. 
 252. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF 
COMPANY LAW EXPERTISE ON ISSUES RELATED TO TAKEOVER BIDS (Jan. 10, 
2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/ 
company/news/hlg01-2002.pdf. [hereinafter REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL 
GROUP]. 
 253. See Case C-483/99, Re Golden Shares: Commission v. French Republic, 
2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002). 
 254. See REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, supra note 252, at 2, 18–20. 
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over bid, the ultimate decision as to tendering shares to a bid-
der and for what price should rest with the shareholders.255  
Second, shareholders should normally carry control rights in 
proportion to the risk their shares carry.256 
The decision of the European Court of Justice, in Commission 
v. French Republic,257 meshed well with the Report of the High 
Level Group.  In this case, the Court invalidated a critical de-
fense mechanism used by European companies in France and 
some other states that is commonly called a “golden share.”  
Such a golden share gives the state the power to approve or dis-
approve any takeover.  France argued that any restrictions on 
the free movement of capital resulting from its golden share in 
Elf-Aquitaine, a petroleum company, were justified under the 
principles of necessity and proportionality, because an interrup-
tion of supplies of petroleum products could affect public secu-
rity.258  The Court disagreed, finding that the golden share was 
a serious interference with the free movement of capital, went 
beyond what was needed to prevent the disruption of petroleum 
supplies, and was therefore in derogation of the EC Treaty.259  
The decision is important because it suggests that other laws 
preventing takeovers could be similarly invalidated by the 
court. 
The Report of the High Level Group discusses the absence of 
a level playing field between the U.S. and the EU that would 
have been created by the failed Thirteenth Directive or a new 
directive drafted in accordance with the Report.  With the adop-
tion of such a directive, European companies would be severely 
restricted in putting up defenses against takeover bids, while 
U.S. companies could use a number of devices to defend against 
  
 255. Id. at 20. 
 256. Id. at 21.  To implement this principle, there were two important pro-
posals.  First, after the announcement of a takeover bid, the board of the of-
feree company should only be able to take actions frustrating the bid with the 
authorization of shareholders at a general meeting.  Id. at 27.  Second, a bid-
der who has acquired 75% or more of risk-bearing capital should be able to 
break through any mechanisms held by the target to frustrate the exercise of 
control by the bidder, including golden shares carrying special control rights 
held by member states.  Id. at 30–31. 
 257. Case C-483/99, Re Golden Shares: Commission v. French Republic, 2  
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002). 
 258. Id. ¶¶ 27–30. 
 259. Id. ¶ 51.  
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a takeover bid.260  The Report argues that there is no level play-
ing field within the U.S. because of differing state laws, and 
that the general legal and capital market environment in the 
U.S. differs widely from the European environment, especially 
as to transparency and the pressure to enhance shareholder 
value.261  Further, the High Level Group suggested that, in 
adopting takeover legislation, the EU should consider what type 
of regulation is needed to enhance the development of efficient, 
integrated capital markets in the EU, rather than what advan-
tages such regulation might give to U.S. companies.262  
V. THEORIES CONCERNING FEDERALISM 
Not all of the overarching theories concerning the value of 
federalism are relevant to financial regulation or securities 
regulation in particular.  For example, the enhancement of de-
mocratic values and the protection of individual liberties263 are 
only tangentially, if at all, related to the sometimes competing 
interests of protecting investors, promoting capital formation, 
and preventing systemic risk to the financial system, the latter 
being the primary goals of securities regulation.264  Although 
federalism has strong defenders, even in the case of economic 
regulation,265 others have argued that national regulation is a 
better way of reaching public policy goals.266 
  
 260. REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, supra note 252, at 40. 
 261. Id. at 40–41. 
 262. Id. at 42. 
 263. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism , 96 YALE 
L.J. 1425 (1987); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: 
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and 
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.  REV. 489 (1977); D. Bruce La 
Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process — The 
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577 
(1985); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: 
Federalism for a Third Century , 88 COLUM . L. REV. 1 (1988). 
 264. See SEC, Who We Are, What We Do, at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).  See also Heidi Mandanis Schoo-
ner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 468 (1986). 
 265. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a 
Better Job Than the States in Regulating Takeovers?, 57 BUS. LAW 1025 
(2002); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securi-
ties Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).  See also A.C. Pritchard, Constitu-
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Much of the academic debate regarding the value of federal-
ism in securities regulation focuses on competition among the 
states for corporate charters, rather than competition among 
federal regulators or between federal and state regulators.  This 
literature discusses whether the competition among the states 
in the corporate law area leads to a race to the bottom, a race to 
the top or an optimal level of regulation.267  Further, much of 
this discussion concerns the specific issue of defenses erected by 
target companies against hostile takeovers.268 
When Congress was in the process of preempting state securi-
ties regulation in the NSMIA and the SLUSA, critics of the two 
acts claimed they would diminish investor protection, whereas 
their supporters argued that they would eliminate duplicative 
and unnecessary regulation and therefore be efficient and effec-
tive.269  Much of the rhetoric in discussions about the value of 
  
tional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435 (2002). 
 266. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.  REV. 
1435 (1992); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on 
a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903 (1994).  
 267. This debate was initiated by William Cary, Federalism and the Corpo-
rate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), arguing that 
the competition for corporate charters led to a race to the bottom respecting 
legal standards.  For a response to the effect that such competition leads to a 
race to the top see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, 
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).  See also 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1–40 (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE LAW 1–2 (1993). 
 268. For the most recent debate on these issues see Bebchuk & Ferrell, su-
pra note 223; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and 
Regulatory Competition, 57 BUS. LAW 1047 (2002); Stephen J. Choi and An-
drew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 961 (2001); Macey, supra note 265; Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political 
Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1103 (2002). 
 269. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of 
Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 497 (2000); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Pro-
tection: Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies For Securi-
ties Fraud, 60. LAW  & CONTEMP. PROB . 169 (1997).  See also Rutheford B. 
Campbell, The Insidious Remnants of State Rules Respecting Capital Forma-
tion, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407 (2000); David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on Califor-
nia’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS . LAW . 1, 51 (1998); Richard H. Walker, Evaluating 
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state securities regulation deals with substantive issues of what 
kind of regulation is appropriate, rather than whether the SEC 
should be the sole regulator in a particular area or whether 
there should be dual regulation by the SEC and the states.  Dis-
cussions of regulatory competition between the SEC and other 
federal regulators also have more to do with politics than prin-
ciple.270 
Some regulatory competition can prevent an agency like the 
SEC from making serious policy mistakes and give voice to in-
terest groups that are ignored by a single national agency due 
to so-called “agency capture” by another interest group.271  Nev-
ertheless, much state securities regulation over the years has 
been duplicative, unnecessarily burdensome, and expensive for 
the securities industry, without adding sufficient value in terms 
of investor protection.  Also, state securities regulation is un-
even from state to state and even from administration to ad-
ministration within a particular state.272  Further, regulatory 
competition between national regulators frequently is an un-
seemly jurisdictional battle fueled by politics.  Moreover, such 
  
The Preemption Evidence: Have The Proponents Met Their Burden?, 60 LAW &  
CONTEMP. PROBS. 237 (1977). 
 270. An independent commission recommended a single federal regulatory 
agency for financial market regulation after the 1987 stock market crash.  See 
THE BRADY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET 
MECHANISMS (1988).  Similar recommendations were made with regard to 
banking regulation during the Bush Administration.  See Kenneth H. Bacon, 
White House Alters Plan on Bank Laws, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1991, at A3.  But 
Congressional oversight committees have never been enthusiastic about such 
consolidation. 
 271. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Signifi-
cance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 
BUS. LAW. 447, 454 (1995).  See also Macey, supra note 265, at 1044–46. 
 272. In some states there are separate securities commissioners; in others 
the securities commissioner may also be the banking and/or insurance com-
missioner.  See North American Securities Administrators Association, 
NASAA Member Representative List, at http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/ 
abtnasaa/find_regulator.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).  The budgets of these 
commissions vary widely.  In New York the Martin Act was rarely enforced for 
many years except to prosecute local scams.  Spitzer, who is a Democrat in a 
Republican administration and who may be interested in higher office, de-
cided to use the Martin Act against prominent investment banking firms.  See 
Editorial, New York’s Bubble Boys, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at A26; Edito-
rial, Spitzer’s Telecom Meltdown, WALL ST. J., April 29, 2002, at A18. 
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competition can lead to disrespect for the law, as one regulator 
undermines the laws and regulations of another regulator.273 
The theory that regulatory competition produces the most ef-
ficient regulatory structure is based on principles of economics 
that fail to sufficiently take into account the psychological fac-
tors affecting investor confidence.  Although the primary goal of 
securities regulation is frequently articulated as investor pro-
tection, this understanding is too simplistic.  Capital formation 
is at the heart of the capitalist system.  The reason securities 
regulation became a matter of federal concern is that there was 
a need to increase investor confidence in order to generate capi-
tal formation in the 1930s.  There was also a need to assure 
against systemic collapses caused by excessive stock market 
speculation leading to the bursting of the stock market bubble 
in 1929 and the bankruptcy of numerous financial institutions.  
State securities regulation and SRO regulation had proved in-
adequate in performing this task, which was national in scope. 
A similar crisis of investor confidence exists today due to the 
bursting of the technology stock market bubble and the corpo-
rate financial scandals of Enron Corp., Worldcom, and other 
companies.274  The SEC reacted to this crisis by prosecuting 
wrongdoers and proposing new regulations on a number of 
fronts, ranging from a new regulatory system for the accounting 
profession, certifications of financial statements by CEOs, to 
certain restrictions on research analysts.275  Congress then at-
tempted to address this crisis by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley 
  
 273. See Coffee, supra note 271, at 473 (1995).  See also Int’l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Am. Bankers Ass’n. v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 274. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Financial Fraud and the New Face of Se-
curities Regulation — Part I, 24 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (West) 65 (July 
2002); Albert A. DeStephano, Lecture On Corporate Securities & Financial 
Law: Panel Discussion: Enron: What Went Wrong?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 1 (2002). 
 275. See Enactment of Broad Accounting, Corporate Governance Reform Act 
Brings New Prohibitions, Requirements for Executives and Auditors, 34 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1281, 1290–95 (Aug. 5, 2002).  See also Michael Schroe-
der, Deals & Dealmakers: SEC Proposes Rules to Improve Disclosure by Public 
Companies, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2002, at C5; Paul Beckett, SEC Order Forces 
Executives To Swear by Their Numbers, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at A1; Mi-
chael Schroeder, Audit-Rules Overhaul Is Proposed in Senate, WALL ST. J.,  
May 9, 2002, at C11. 
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Act.276  The NASAA and the New York Attorney General tried 
to address these problems by investigating and prosecuting 
Merrill Lynch and other securities firms.277 
The issue addressed by this Article is whether problems of 
this magnitude should be solved by a national regulator, the 
SEC, or a dual regulatory system of the SEC and state regula-
tors.  Since the problems are national, and in some respects in-
ternational in scope, an effective national regulator seems more 
appropriate than piecemeal state regulation.  On the other 
hand, aggressive state action, such as the New York Attorney 
General’s action against Merrill Lynch, can highlight gaps and 
problems with the federal regulatory scheme.  But now that 
Congress has dealt with this issue and ordered the SEC and 
SROs to find regulatory solutions, should state regulation be 
permitted to continue?  Continued state regulation might prove 
costly and may lead to conflicting regulations; if so, the benefits 
to investors will be problematic.  Hopefully, the SEC, the SROs, 
and the state regulators will cooperate to produce a uniform 
national standard for dealing with analysts’ conflicts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The allocation of regulatory responsibilities between federal 
and state securities regulators has not always been logical or 
even coherent, because it is affected by politics and economic 
history.  Even as this Article was being written, the traditional 
lines between federal and state responsibility for overseeing the 
conduct of public corporations was being changed in the U.S. by 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which federalized the 
law governing corporate audit committees and yet left imple-
mentation of this legislation to SROs as well as to the SEC.278  
Similarly, implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan 
was limiting the ability of member state regulators to maintain 
national standards in the face of further harmonization of EU 
  
 276. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  See also Greg Hitt, 
Bush Signs Sweeping Legislation Aimed at Curbing Corporate Fraud, WALL 
ST. J., July 31, 2002, at A4. 
 277. See supra text accompanying notes 147–53.  
 278. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301. 
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law.279  Yet, in the wake of the financial fraud scandals roiling 
the stock markets in the U.S. and Europe, both federal and 
state securities regulators were endeavoring to assert their ju-
risdiction over wrongdoers.  In short, the subject of this Article 
is current and fluid. 
Although some long-term principles would appear to animate 
legislators in their reactions to financial crisis, fixing an imme-
diate problem often compromises such principles.  As a general 
matter, in the U.S. regulation of financial institutions and 
products has been given to federal regulators and the rules per-
taining to corporate governance have been left to the states.  
Investor protection historically has been a matter of dual fed-
eral and state regulation.  Yet, when Congress believed that 
duplicative regulation and strike suits were impairing capital 
formation, it enacted the NSMIA and then the SLUSA, imping-
ing upon both state securities and common laws.280  When Con-
gress believed that corporate law was not adequately protecting 
investors from fraud, it impinged upon state corporate law 
through the Williams Act and then the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.281 
In Europe, there has been an overriding concern with the 
need for economic integration and recognition that uniform fi-
nancial regulation can be a barrier to competition.  Yet, despite 
the importance of the single passport, host countries have thus 
far been able to impose customer protection principles upon fi-
nancial institutions from other countries.282  Further, the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity has been utilized as a brake upon harmoni-
zation and integration.  Impatience with the progress of finan-
cial market integration and a fear that the European capital 
markets were not sufficiently competitive with U.S. capital 
markets led to the Financial Services Action Plan and the Lam-
falussy Report — initiatives that evidenced regulatory competi-
tion on an international level.283 
  
 279. See United Kingdom Moves to Protect EC-Threatened Stock Listing 
Regime, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1309-10 (Aug. 5, 2002). 
 280. See supra notes 64–65. 
 281. See supra note 167.  
 282. See Gerard Hertig, Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial 
Services, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 177, 181 (1994). 
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 188–199.  See also Amir N. Licht, 
Regulatory Arbitrage for Real, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563 (1998). 
File: KARMEL Base Macro  Final.doc Created on: 4/4/2003 2:32 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:30 AM 
2003] SECURITIES REGULATION U.S. & EU 547 
As securities markets have become national and even inter-
national and significantly affect the national economic welfare 
in the U.S. and the EU-wide markets in Europe, there has been 
a trend toward federalizing securities regulation.  This trend 
probably will continue.  Yet, when local investors and constitu-
ents are implicated, state regulators become active.284  Only 
when dual regulation becomes unnecessarily costly or at odds 
with federal regulation, is it likely to be supplanted by federal 
regulation. 
The availability of the Supremacy Clause under the U.S. 
Constitution appears to provide a mechanism for dealing with 
policy conflicts between federal and state law that is not avail-
able in Europe.  The European Court of Justice has neverthe-
less managed to invalidate national law that is contrary to the 
principles of the TEU.285  In both the U.S. and Europe, the po-
litical process whereby securities regulation is allocated be-
tween federal (or EU) and state authorities is extremely com-
plex and time consuming.  This means that regulatory change 
generally is incremental.  Further, interest group pressure is a 
factor not only with regard to the substance of regulation but 
also whether regulation is imposed by federal, state, or SRO 
administrators. 
U.S. constitutional law and the TEU provide theoretical 
frameworks for reconciling federal and state interests in securi-
ties regulation.  Developments in the securities markets, includ-
ing corporate scandals, financial failures, and political compro-
mises explain how such theory is applied, sometimes logically 
but often haphazardly.  Although investor protection should be 
the guiding principle for allocating regulatory responsibility, so 
many complex factors go into promoting investor confidence 
that it is difficult to determine whether the SEC (or an organ of 
the EU) or state regulators should necessarily be the guardians 
of investors.  Prevention of systemic risk, for example, gives 
federal securities regulators some responsibility for maintain-
ing the long-term financial health of the securities industry.  
Further, promotion of capital formation is a federal goal that 
underlies investor protection.  Concern about the viability of 
pension plans is another growing policy consideration in balanc-
  
 284. See supra text accompanying notes 147–56. 
 285. See supra note 177. 
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ing the interests of investors against those of business.  State 
regulators tend to view investors more as consumers than as 
capitalists, but on the other hand have an interest in encourag-
ing businesses to incorporate and do business within their ju-
risdictions.  These classic tensions between finance and indus-
try frequently translate into constitutional law tensions. 
Regulatory competition exists between federal and state 
agencies and courts, as well as between federal financial regula-
tors, and between regulators in different countries.  This com-
petition frequently is fomented by affected business interests, 
but can be reconciled through coordination and cooperation.  In 
order for competing regulatory interests to be reconciled, how-
ever, regulators must have the same vision of which investor 
interests require protection and how that protection should be 
achieved. 
